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The Home Ownership and Equity
Protection Act of 1994: Extending Liability

for Predatory Subprime Loans to
Secondary Mortage Market Participants
By Lisa Keyfetz*

Introduction
The growth in the subprime mortgage market over the past
decade has been accompanied by a widespread epidemic of lending
abuses. These "predatory lending" practices entail a variety of
manipulative marketing and structuring schemes that strip
homeowners of substantial equity in their homes and eventually push
them into foreclosure.' These abusive practices impose substantial
costs on families and neighborhoods by leaving families homeless,
disintegrating low-income communities, and eroding tax bases.2 In
response to evidence of a pattern of abuse in the subprime mortgage
market, Congress passed the Home Ownership and Equity Protection
Act ("HOEPA" or the "Act") in 1994.3 HOEPA amends the Truth-in* Lisa

Keyfetz is an associate at Kozyak Tropin & Throckmorton, P.A. in

Miami, Florida, where she focuses on bankruptcy and commercial litigation. Lisa
earned her B.A. in Economics from Harvard College in 2001, and received her
J.D., magna cum laude, from Harvard Law School in 2005. During law school,
Lisa was a student attorney at the Hale and Dorr Legal Services Center, where she
was involved in bankruptcy litigation involving predatory lending claims against
mortgage holders and mortgage servicers.
1 See Margot Saunders, The Increase in PredatoryLending and Appropriate
Remedial Actions, 6 N.C. BANKING INST. 111, 114 (2002). The number of home
foreclosures rose 338% between 1980 and 1999. Id. Subprime loan originations
increased over 400% during the same time period. See infra Part II.B.
2 Saunders, supra note 1, at 141.
3 See Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of
1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325, § 151-58, 108 Stat. 2190-98 (1994) (enacted as a part
of the federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1649; 12 C.F.R.
§ 226, Reg. Z). See also S. REP. No. 103-69, at 22-23 (1994), reprinted in 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1881, 1993 WL 444316 (describing the pattern of abuse that
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Lending Act ("TILA") by requiring additional disclosures and
substantive protections for certain high-interest and high-fee home
equity loans. Given the dominant role the secondary market plays in
demanding and financing subprime mortgages, HOEPA's drafters
focused on the need for a mechanism to hold financiers of predatory
lending accountable for the misconduct of their counterparts in the
primary mortgage origination market. Accordingly, HOEPA's
primary enforcement mechanism is an expanded private right of
action for borrowers against subsequent purchasers or "assignees" of
high cost loans ("assignee liability").
HOEPA's assignee liability provisions can be a powerful
vehicle for regulating the home equity lending market and for
challenging abusive lending practices through the courts; however,
the Act also has its limits. Thus, the legal community must be
intimately aware of the statutory provisions and judicial
interpretations regarding assignee liability under HOEPA. To this
end, this article proceeds as follows: Part I discusses the subprime
mortgage market and reviews evidence of the prevalence of abuse in
the market. Part II presents HOEPA's general rationale for extending
liability to assignees, specifically, as a mechanism to encourage selfpolicing of the subprime mortgage market. Parts III-V examine the
scope, limitations, and future of assignee liability under HOEPA, and
Part VI presents state law theories which also impose liability on
assignees of predatory loans.

I.

Overview of the Subprime Mortgage Market

A. The Problem of Predatory Lending in the Subprime
Mortgage Market
The "subprime market" is a broad label used to describe the
market for extending credit to borrowers who have impaired or
limited credit history or high debt.5 Because of their credit status,
subprime borrowers pay higher interest rates and higher upfront fees
emerged from testimony in Senate hearings).
4 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1649; 12 C.F.R. § 226, Reg. Z. See also S. REP.
No.
103-69, at 22-23.
5 JOINT U.S. DEP'T OF HouSNG AND URBAN DEV.-U.S. DEP'T OF THE
TREASURY TASK FORCE ON PREDATORY LENDING, CURBING PREDATORY HOME
MORTGAGE
LENDING,
at
13
(June
2000),
http://www.huduser.org/

publications/hsgfm/curbing.htnl [hereinafter Curbing Predatory Home Mortgage
Lending].
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to borrow money than borrowers in the prime market. 6 Most
commonly, borrowers obtain subprime mortgage loans from nondepository institutions.7 However, national banks, thrifts, and their
affiliates are increasingly taking part in the subprime market.8 The
subprime mortgage market has grown tremendously since the
deregulation of the lending industry during the. 1980s. 9 In particular,
subprime mortgage originations have skyrocketed over the past
decade, increasing ten-fold from $35 billion in 1994 to $332 billion
in 2003.1'
A joint task force conducted by the Department of Housing
and Urban Development ("HUD") and the Department of the
Treasury concluded that the subprime residential mortgage market is
ripe with "predatory lending" practices in which loan originators use
fraud, deception, or other manipulative techniques to extend credit in
ways intended to strip borrowers of the equity in their homes. 1
Because predatory lending practices can take so many forms, the
term is broadly defined as a "mismatch between the needs and
capacity of the borrower," which results in a loan with terms so
disadvantageous to a particular borrower that there is little likelihood

6

Id.

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R.
Part 226, Final Rule at 7, http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/
boardacts/2001/200112142/attachment.pdf (last visited Jan. 6, 2005) [hereinafter
"Regulation Z, Final Rule (Dec. 21, 2001)"].
8 National banks, thrifts, and their affiliates accounted for about twenty
7

percent of subprime loan originations in 2002. See Edward M. Gramlich, Fed.
Reserve Sys. Governor, Subprime Mortgage Lending: Benefits, Costs, and
Challenges, Remarks at the FinancialServices Roundtable Annual Housing Policy
Meeting, Chicago, Illinois (May 21, 2004), http://www.federalreserve.gov/
boarddocs/speeches/2004/2004052 1/default.htm [hereinafter Remarks by Governor
Edward Gramlich].
9 See Saunders, supra note 1, at 115-16.
1o See Curbing Predatory Home Mortgage Lending, supra note 5, at 24;
Promoting Homeowership by Ensuring Liquity in Subprime Mortgage Market:
Joint Hearing Before Subcomm. on Fin. Inst. and Consumer Credit-Subcomm. on
Hous. and Cmty. Opportunity, 108th Cong. 4 (2004) (statement of Michael
Calhoun, Gen. Counsel, Ctr. For Responsible Lending), available at
http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/062304-calhoun-housetestimony.pdf
[hereinafter Statement of Michael Calhoun].
" See Curbing Predatory Home Mortgage Lending, supra note 5, at 1;
Regulation Z, Final Rule (Dec. 21, 2001), supra note 7, at 1-2.
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that the borrower can repay the loan.' 2 Thus, "predatory lending" is
practices that create an
most aptly described as lending
13
offoreclosure.
risk
unreasonable
To illustrate, consider the case of Ms. "J.," who testified about
her experience in the subprime mortgage market before the Joint U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development -U.S. Department
of the Treasury Task Force on Predatory Lending:
Ms. J., who is 71 years old, received a phone call from a
mortgage broker, who promised her that he would
refinance her two existing mortgages, provide her with
$5,000 in extra cash and lower her monthly payments. Ms.
J. needed cash to repair her kitchen, so she agreed to meet.
The broker visited Ms. J. at her home. Ms. J. maintains that
he gained her trust by claiming that he liked her as a person
and he wanted to help senior citizens because his own
father had recently died of cancer. Later, the broker
returned to Ms. J.'s house to have her sign the mortgage
loan papers. Ms. J. said that she could not read the
documents carefully because she suffers from vision
problems and has a limited education. Ms. J. said she
signed the mortgage loan documents based on the broker's
12

Kurt Eggert, Held Up in Due Course: PredatoryLending, Securitization,

and the Holder in Due Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REv 503, 511 (2002)
(citing Daniel S. Ehrenberg, If the Loan Don't Fit, Don 't Take It: Applying the
SuitabilityDoctrine to the Mortgage Industry to Eliminate PredatoryLending, 10 J.
AFFORDABLE Hous. & CMTY. DEV. L. 117, 119-20 (2001)).
13 Cf Baher Azmy & David Reiss, Modeling a Response to Predatory
Lending: The New Jersey Home Ownership Security Act of 2002, 35 RUTGERS L. J.
645, 650 (Winter 2002). In The Two-Income Trap: Why Middle Class Mothers and
Fathers Are Going Broke (2003), Elizabeth Warren and Amelia Warren Tyagi
point out that it would never be acceptable to sell consumers a toaster that had a
one in twelve chance of blowing up. See Protecting Homeowners: Preventing
Abusive Lending While Preserving Access to Credit: Joint Hearing Before the
House Subcomm. on Hous. and Cmty. Opportunity and the House Subcomm. on
Fin. Inst. and Consumer Credit, 108th Cong. 7-8 (2003) (statement of Margot
Saunders, Managing Attorney, Nat'l Consumer L. Ctr.), available at
http://www.nclc.org/initiatives/predatorymortgage/content/AccessToCredit.pdf
[hereinafter Statement of Margot Saunders] (citing Elizabeth Warren & Amelia
Warren Tyagi, The Two-Income Trap: Why Middle Class Mothers and FathersAre
Going Broke, Chapter 6, (2003)). To the extent the manufacturer knowingly sold
consumers a toaster that posed such a risk, the manufacturer's conduct would be
even more objectionable and punished more severely. Id. Similarly, it cannot be
acceptable to originate mortgage loans where one in twelve loans end up in
foreclosure. Knowingly originating loans with such a high risk is predatory. Id.
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promises and representations that the mortgage loan would
provide her with cash to repair her kitchen and lower her
monthly mortgage payments.
Ms. J. received a $90,100 mortgage with an APR of
14.819% [about 8% above benchmark Treasury Rate]. The
mortgage loan contained a 15 -year balloon note that
required a final payment of $79,722.61 (due when she was
86 years old). Ms. J. paid 10% of the loan amount, or
$9,100 as a broker's fee. The monthly payment increased to
approximately 80% of her monthly income. Ms. J. did not
14
receive any money from the proceeds of this transaction.
Thus, Ms. J's contract required payments of approximately
$1,130 per month for 15 years, totaling $203,000. At the end of 15
years she would have built zero additional equity in her home from
the $203,000 in payments-the $10,000 loan amortization from
$90,100 to $79,722 over the fifteen years only paid the $9,100
broker's fee, which was packed into Ms. J's loan upfront, and
financed at the 14.819% interest rate.
Ms. J's experience highlights several abusive practices that
are commonly used in subprime home equity lending, including
packing of excessive upfront points and fees, balloon payments that
require refinancing (and thus more fees), and loan terms that the
borrower cannot afford based on her fixed income. These abusive
terms are generally obtained by aggressive and manipulative sales
tactics, often amounting to outright fraud; for example, the "bait and
switch" strategy used against Ms. J, who expected the refinancing to
result in lower monthly payments and extra cash, but ended up
increasing her loan payments to 80% of her monthly income.
Moreover, the abusive practices are specifically targeted at
unsophisticated, elderly, or low-income borrowers. As confessed by a
predatory lender in a testimony before the U.S. Senate Special
Committee on Aging:
Finance companies try to do business with blue-collar
workers, people who haven't gone to college, older people
who are on fixed incomes, non English-speaking people
and people who have significant equity in their homes. In
fact, my perfect customer would be an uneducated widow
who is on a fixed income-hopefully from her deceased
14

Curbing PredatoryHome MortgageLending, supra note 5, at 21-22.
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husband's pension and social security-who has her house
paid off, is living off of credit cards, but having a difficult
time keeping up her payments, and who must make
a car
5
payment in addition to her credit card payments.'
Spoken like a true predator.
Ms. J's story represents, only a subset of the predatory
practices used by mortgage brokers and mortgage bankers to push
unnecessary and mismatched loans onto unsuspecting borrowers. For
example, the equally rampant predatory practice of "loan flipping"
involves repeatedly refinancing mortgages in a short period of time
with high fees and prepayment penalties at each step along the way.
Ms. Podelco testified before the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs about how Beneficial Finance, United,
and Equity One flipped her mortgage seven times between May 1995
and August 1996.1 Over the course of the two years, Ms. Podelco's
home equity loan increased from $11,921 to over $64,000. She
received $21.70 in cash out of the seven transactions, with the
remaining $52,000 of debt increase going to finance origination fees
(as high as $18,192 for flip number four). As with most victims of
predatory lending, the story did not end well for Ms. Podelco either:
By the end of February, I had had five different loans in ten
months. I didn't understand that they were adding a lot of
charges each time... [After two more flips the payments

15 Equity Predators: Stripping, Flipping and Packing Their Way to Profits:

HearingBefore the Special Committee on Aging, 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of
"Jim
Dough,"
finance
industry
employee),
available
at
http://aging.senate.gov/public/events/hr14jd.htm [hereinafter Statement of "Jim
Dough "].
16 "Loan flipping" is analogous to "churning" in the securities brokerage
industry. Loan flipping is one of the most common means used by lenders or
brokers to strip equity from a consumer's home. See S. REP. No. 103-69, at 25
(1994), reprintedin 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1881, 1993 WL 444316. As confessed by
a predatory lender in testimony before the U.S. Senate, "[w]e were instructed and
expected to flip as many loans as possible. One of my supervisors imposed a daily
requirement that each branch employee obtain at least two applications from
present borrowers to refinance their loans. In other words, each branch employee
was supposed to try to flip at least two loans each day." Statement of "Jim
Dough, " supra note 15.
17 Predatory Mortgage Lending: The Problem, Impact and Responses,
HearingBefore Senate Comm. On Banking, Hous., and UrbanAffairs, 107th Cong.
(2001) (prepared testimony of Ms. Mary Podelco, private citizen),
http://banking.senate.gov/01_07hrg/072601/podelco.htm.
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were too much and] I lost my home to foreclosure... I now
understand that these lenders pushed me into loans I
couldn't pay. Adding all of these fees and costs each time
caused me to lose my home, a home that I owned free and
clear shortly after my husband died.
Like Ms. J., the unsuspecting Ms. Podelco became prey to an
industry practice designed to strip her of her most valuable asset, her
home.
The predatory practice of "steering" has also been widely
documented . Steering involves directing borrowers to loans with
extraordinarily high interest rates or finance charges relative to their
risk. For example, a whistle-blower at First Alliance Mortgage
Company, a finance company that was eventually prosecuted for
predatory lending violations, admitted that First Alliance's customers
with "A" credit ratings would pay the same high fees as customers
with "D" ratings. The whistle-blower explained that he wished he
could have told his better customers that "every step they took [away]
from [his] door to [the conventional branch bank down the street]
would save them $1,000 on their loan."' 19 Steering is probably the
most widespread predatory practice in the subprime mortgage
market. In particular, several studies indicate that about 50% of all
subprime borrowers could have obtained loans in the prime market
based on their credit status, but were steered toward higher interest
rate loans by deceptive brokers.2 0 In large part steering is driven by
payment of "yield spread premiums" to brokers, as a reward for
originating loans at above-market interest rates and fees relative to
the borrower's credit risk.2 1 Notwithstanding whether subprime
18

See Azmy, supra note 13, at 706 (citing studies by both government

sponsored agencies and the lending industry regarding the prevalence of steering).
19Diana Henriques & Lowell Bergman, Mortgaged Lives: A Special Report.
ProfitingFrom Fine Print With Wall Street's Help, N. Y. TIMES, March 15, 2000,
at Section 1 Page A l.
20 See Azmy, supra note 13, at 706 (citing studies by both government
sponsored agencies and the lending industry regarding the prevalence of steering).
21 A yield spread premium is a cash bonus that a broker receives from a lender
as a reward for placing borrowers in a loan with a higher interest rate that the lender
would expect based on the borrowers risk profile. Eighty-five to ninety percent of
subprime loan transactions involve yield spread premium payments. CTR. FOR
RESPONSIBLE LENDING, CRL ISSUE BRIEF #11,
EQUITY
FOR
INCENTIVE
POWERFUL

YIELD SPREAD PREMIUMS: A
2004),
(June
THEFT

See
http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/ib01 l-YSP_-EquityTheft-0604.pdf.
also Howell E. Jackson & Jeremy Berry, Kickbacks or Compensation: The Case of
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lending abuses come in the form of "bait and switch" tactics,
steering, or flipping, the outcome of predatory lending is the same for
homeowners-foreclosure.
B. The Costs of Predatory Lending
Predatory practices pervade subprime credit products such as
payday loans, tax refund anticipation loans, and rent-to-own
contracts. Still, predatory practices within the residential mortgage
market are most concerning because of the severe consequences for
families who lose their homes. Moreover, the tremendous growth in
subprime residential mortgage originations over the past decade,
from $35 billion in 1994 to $332 billion in 2003, creates the risk22that
these costs to families and neighborhoods will continue to grow.
Predatory lending has resulted in a higher number of
foreclosures in a shorter period,23 devastating families and
neighborhoods primarily in lower-income, minority, and elderly
communities. The foreclosure rate among subprime mortgages is 8%
nationally, with some states facing foreclosure rates in excess of
12%.24 By comparison, the foreclosure rate for prime loans is 1%.25
Excluding the costs from foreclosures, which may be too difficult to
quantify, the Center for Responsible Lending estimates that predatory
lending costs home loan borrowers $9.1 billion annually as a result of
exorbitant fees and penalties (such as those charged to Ms. Podelco),
unnecessary products (such as financed credit insurance), and riskrate disparities resulting from steering (such as those described by the
First Alliance whistle-blower).26
Yield Spread Premiums (Jan 8,
2002), http://www.law.harvard.edu/
faculty/hjackson/pdfs/january-draft.pdf (examining the debate surrounding the
legality of yield spread premiums under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act
of 1974).
22

Curbing PredatoryHome Mortgage Lending, supra note 5, at 4. Statement

of Michael Calhoun, supra note 10, at 2.
23 See Statement of Margot Saunders, supra note 13, at 7-8. See, e.g., Eggert,
supra note 12, at 581 (reviewing a study of foreclosure trends in Baltimore that
found that foreclosure occurs 1.8 years after origination of a subprime loan versus
3.2 years after origination for a prime loan on average).
24 Statement of Margot Saunders,supra note 13, at 7-8.
25

Id. at 8.

26

ERIC

ECONOMIC

STEIN,

CTR.

COST

OF

FOR

RESPONSIBLE

PREDATORY

LENDING,
LENDING,

http://www.predatorylending.org/pdfs/QuantI 0-01.pdf.
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Borrowers of subprime residential mortgages do not benefit
from this extension of credit in the form of increasing access to
homeownership. While loan originations have increased nearly tenfold since 1994, home ownership has only increased 3-4% over the
same period 2 7 This results from the fact that over 80% of subprime
loans are refinancings z8 Lenders push borrowers to take on long-term
credit secured by the borrowers' home equity to pay for mounting
credit card, health care, or other unsecured, short-term consumer
debts. Even if the long-term mortgage is financed at a lower interest
rate, the extended-maturity trade is not a trade that any informed,
intelligent consumer would make. For example, consider a five-year,
$20,000 car loan at 15% that is refinanced into a thirty-year home
equity loan at 12%:
" Five-Year Car Loan with Monthly Installments: Borrower pays
$476 per month, for payments totaling $28,548. The borrower's
interest expense is $8,548.
"
Thirty-Year Home Equity Loan with Monthly Mortgage
Payments: Borrower pays $206 per month for the car, for
payments totaling $74,060. The borrower's interest expense is
$54,060, over six times the interest on the short-term loan.2 9
Moreover, the car does not last more than ten years, so the
borrower will be paying off the car long after he can no longer
use it.

While this trade is detrimental for consumers, lenders are
clearly aware of the value of the trade to them. As confessed by
predatory lender "Jim Dough" in testimony before the Senate, finance
companies regularly follow up purchases on retail installment loans
to encourage the consumer to make the extended-maturity trade:
Although we would tell customers that we were calling to
see if they got their merchandise, the real purpose of the
call was to solicit the customer into converting the retail
installment loan into a more profitable personal loan or
home equity loan... To flip one of these small loans into a
27

Remarks by GovernorEdward Gramlich, supra note 8.

28

Curbing PredatoryHome MortgageLending, supra note 5, at 25.

29

Even assuming a 30% benefit in the form of lower taxes because of the

deductibility of home mortgage interest, the borrower still pays $37,842 in interest
for the long-term loan versus $8,548 for the short-term loan. See Statement of
Margot Saunders, supra note 13, at 5.
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personal or home equity loan, we were trained to sell the
monthly "savings," that is, how much less per month the
customer would be paying if we flipped the loan. In reality,
the "savings" that we were trained to sell to customers were
just an illusion. The uneducated customer would jump for
the "savings," thinking that he would have more money to
buy other things. What the customer wouldn't figure out
and what we wouldn't tell him is that he would be paying
for a longer period
of time and in the end would pay a
3
whole lot more. 0
As illustrated by this testimony, subprime credit is usually
something that the lender, not the borrower, needs. The home equity
loan market has therefore been described as a "push" or supplydriven market. 3 1 Lenders often encourage brokers, who take
advantage of borrowers' susceptibilities, lack of information, lack of
market competition and
32 insufficient regulation, to push too much
consumers.
onto
credit
C. Securitization: Driving the Market for Subprime Mortgages
Securitization has been the most substantial driving force
behind the push to originate subprime home equity loans.3 3
"Securitization" refers to the pooling of financial assets, such as
mortgage loans, and the issuance of securities representing interests
in the pool of assets (termed "Mortgaged Backed Securities" or
"MBS"). 34 Issuance of subprime MBS has risen twenty-fold over the
Statement of "Jim Dough," supra note 15, at 5-6. For another equally
troubling example, see Henriques, supra note 19 (describing the sales scheme used
in the First Alliance fraud, in which the finance company staffed its offices with
experienced car salespeople and trained them to deliver a highly-manipulative,
twenty-seven page script known as "The Track").
31 Statement of Margot Saunders,supra note 13, at 3.
32 See id.; CurbingPredatoryHome Mortgage Lending, supra note 5, at 3, 19.
30

33 See Eggert, supra note 12, at 577-78. Several other legal and economic
factors including tax incentives created by the deductibility of mortgage interest
and the deregulation of financial institutions have also contributed to the
exponential growth in subprime home equity lending. Id. at 578-80.
34 Id. at 535.
Prior to securitization-based financing, borrowers obtained
mortgage loans from a thrift or other local lending institution, which was
responsible for the entire mortgage production process--originating the mortgage,
funding the mortgage, and servicing the mortgage to its maturity as part of the
institution's portfolio of assets. Id. at 536. The move toward securitization based-
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past decade, from $10 billion in 1994 to $203 billion in 2003. 35
In a typical securitization, money is provided by the
secondary market first, and a commitment to make loans to
individual borrowers follows. 36 Specifically, banks and investors
create the demand for home equity mortgages by financing the
purchase of mortgages for the investment pools. Demand is then
filled by finance company employees such as "Jim Dough" who
opportunistically seek out victims in whom to "invest" the investors'
capital. 3 7 Access to securitization-based financing is a boon to these
finance companies. For example, First Alliance Mortgage Co.
documented a six-fold increase in originations once it gained access
to mortgage market financing. 38 Accordingly, securitization has
resulted in the creation of an entire industry of mortgage originators
whose incentives are to push high-cost, 39high-fee loans onto
consumers regardless of need or compatibility.
Borrowers typically interact with a mortgage broker that
designs and originates the borrower's mortgage. 40 Unbeknownst to
the borrower, the loan is actually funded by a larger financial

financing of home mortgages began in 1970 when Government National Mortgage
Association (GNMA) executed the first publicly-traded mortgage-backed
securitization. Id. at 536-37.
35 Statement of Michael Calhoun, supra note 10, at 4 (noting loan originations
increased from $35 billion to $203 billion over the same time period). See also
CHARLES SCHORIN, LAURA HEINS, & AMOL PRASAD, MORGAN STANLEY, MORGAN
STANLEY HOME EQUITY HANDBOOK

at 2 (2003) (stating home equity lending now

accounts for over 40% of the U.S. Asset Backed Securities market, the largest
single securitized asset class) [hereinafter Morgan Stanley Home Equity
Handbook].
36 Statement of Margot Saunders,supra note 13, at 3.
As explained by Jeffrey Zeltzer, executive director of the National Home
Equity Mortgage Association, "lenders and mortgage brokers went out to try to
make as many loans as they could" to meet Wall Street's burgeoning demand for
subprime mortgages in the later half of the 1990s. Henriques, supra note 19, at Al.
37

38 Id.

See ProtectingHomeowners: PreventingAbusive Lending While Preserving
Access to Credit: Joint Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Housing and Cmty.
Opportunity and the Subcommittee on Fin. Inst. and Consumer Credit. 108th Cong.
8-10 (2003) (statement of Kurt Eggert, Associate Professor of Law at Chapman
University School of Law), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/
media/pdf/1 10503ke.pdf.
40 See Michael G. Jacobides, Mortgage Banking Unbundling: Structure,
Automation and Profit, MORTGAGE BANKING, Jan. 31, 2001, at 29.
39
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institution, generally an investment bank or large finance company.
The investment bank underwrites or immediately purchases the
newly-originated mortgage as part of an ongoing or pre-arranged
relationship with the mortgage broker or finance company. 42 The
investment bank then aggregates several mortgages from different
brokers to create the pool for the securitization. To execute the
securitization, the financial institution transfers the pool of mortgages
into a trust (the "securitization entity"), hires a rating agency to assess
the riskiness of the mortgage assets in the trust, and issues debt
securities backed by the pool of mortgages. a The rating agency plays
a critical role in analyzing the characteristics of the mortgages in the
pool and forecasting expected cash flows from the pool to inform
investors regarding the likelihood of repayment on their debt
investments. The securitization entity then employs a "servicer,"
responsible for collecting the cash flows due on the mortgages in its
trust. 46 The purchasers of the mortgage-backed securities (the
"investors") become the economic owners of the cash flows due
under the loan agreement secured by the mortgage. These investors
provide a permanent source of funding for the subprime mortgage.47
The shift toward securitization-based financing of subprime
home loans has resulted in considerable segmentation of the
mortgage-lending business. 48 The functions of originating, funding,
servicing, and evaluating the risks of each mortgage loan are

41

See Eggert, supra note 12, at 539.

42

See id. at 538-39.

See also Dominick A. Mazzagetti, Dealing with
Mortgage Loan Brokers: Legal and PracticalIssues, 114 BANKING L.J. 923, 93132 (1997) (grouping the relationship between lenders and brokers into five
categories, which represent a sliding scale in terms of the lenders involvement in
the origination of the loan). See also relationship between Lehman Brothers and
First Alliance Mortgage Company discussed infra Part VII.B.
43 See Eggert, supra note 12, at 538.
44

Id. at 539.

41

Id. at 540-41.
Id. at 543-44.

46

See id. at 542-43 (stating that MBS investors typically include mutual funds,
pension funds, insurance companies, or other institutions, and that after the investor
reviews the securities and decides to invest, the investor remains completely
passive, and a third party is hired by the securitization trustee to service the
mortgage pool and pass cash flows through to investors).
48 Id. at 543.
47
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increasingly provided by separate, specialized entities.49 The
mortgage industry argues that such segmentation creates benefits for
lenders, investors, and borrowers. For lenders, securitization serves as
a leveraging tool, allowing the mortgage originator to receive
immediate repayment on loan originations from which to originate
new loans. 50 For investors, securitization of a subprime mortgage
creates a new, diverse asset class with varied sensitivity and
correlation to changes in interest rates.5 1 For borrowers, the increased
liquidity of mortgages combined with access to a new source of
capital arguably allows for more widespread access to credit and
lower interest rates. 52 However, as discussed in Part II below, the
segmentation in the mortgage market resulting from the move toward
securitization-based financing has also created a regulatory gap,
resulting in destructive incentives for originators of subprime
mortgage loans.
Assignee Liability: Restoring Balance to the

II.

Subprime Motgage Market
The destructive incentives in the origination of subprime
mortgage loans are encouraged by a legal construct known as the
Holder in Due Course ("HDC") doctrine, which allows assignees of
mortgage notes to circumvent lending regulations by "laundering"
abusive loans. Specifically, the HDC doctrine frees assignees of
liability for many claims and defenses which the borrower would
have against the original lender. As a result, the HDC doctrine makes
the current system "perfect for washing everybody's hands of any
responsibility [... ]. At each step, it gets harder and harder to hold
anybody accountable." 53 This lack of accountability for lending
violations encourages subprime mortgage financiers to supply
mortgage brokers with capital with which to push subprime
49 Jacobides, supra note 40 (as explained by a senior mortgage banking
executive, "[t]he industry has been broken apart into a multitude of different
entities. Mortgage origination is often distinct from mortgage funding. And
mortgage funding is often quite distinct from mortgage servicing ....
50 See Eggert, supra note 12, at 546.

See id. at 547. See also Morgan Stanley Home Equity Handbook, supra
note 35, at 5.
52 Eggert, supra note 12, at 535; 545-46.
51

Henriques, supra note 19, at 14 (citing Joshua Zinner, the coordinator of a
foreclosure prevention project at South Brooklyn Legal Services).
53
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mortgages. As bluntly stated by a spokesman for Lehman Brothers
when asked about the investment bank's role in financing the activity
of a predatory lender, Lehman Brothers is an "underwriter, not a
regulator." 54 Given secondary-market players' passive view of their
role, Congress recognized the need to subject them to liability for the
misconduct of their primary-market counterparts to restore
accountability to the subprime mortgage market.
A. Laundering Lending Abuses through the Holder in Due
Course Doctrine
It is a general principle of contract law that claims and
defenses to a contract survive any transfer of the agreement to a new
party. However, an exception to this general principle, the HDC
doctrine, developed as one of commercial law's primary mechanisms
for encouraging the flow of credit. 55 The doctrine permits assignees
of "negotiable instruments" to protect themselves from many claims
and defenses to payment that a borrower would have against the
original lender, as long as the assignee did not have knowledge of the
56
claims and defenses at the time of transfer of the instrument.
Without the HDC rule, assignees of negotiable instruments step into
the shoes of their seller, and would be liable for any claims or
defenses that could have been brought against the seller ("assignee
54
55

Id. at 13 (citing William J. Aheam, a spokesman for Lehman Brothers).
Statement of Margot Saunders,supra note 13, at 13-14.

The modem HDC doctrine is codified in section 3-305(b) of the Revised
Article Three of the Uniform Commercial Code:
56

Defenses and Claims in Recoupment.... The right of a holder in due
course to enforce the obligation of a party to pay the instrument is
subject to defenses of the obligor stated in subsection (a)(1) [that is "(i)
infancy of the obligor to the extent it is a defense to a simple contract,
(ii) duress, lack of legal capacity, or illegality of the transaction which,
under other law, nullifies the obligation of the obligor, (iii) fraud that
induced the obligor to sign the instrument with neither knowledge nor
reasonable opportunity to learn of its character or its essential terms, or
(iv) discharge of the obligor in insolvency proceedings"], but is not
subject to defenses of the obligor stated in subsection (a)(2) (that is,
defenses of the obligor stated in another section of Article 3 or "that
would be available if the person entitled to enforce the instrument were
enforcing a right to payment under a simple contract"] or claims in
recoupment stated in subsection (a)(3) [that is claims "of the obligor
against the original payee of the instrument if the claim arose from the
transaction that gave rise to the instrument"] against a person other than
the holder.
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liability"). The HDC rule, therefore, seeks to encourage
transferability of negotiable instruments by eliminating assignee
liability. 57
Several courts have recognized the applicability of the HDC
doctrine to mortgage notes. 58 In the context of a securitization, the
HDC defense often prevents borrowers from suing or defending
against claims brought by the securitization entity. 59 In fact, the
entities that structure securitizations of residential mortgages are
often "coached" in the means to transfer ownership such that the
buyer can become a Holder in Due Course. 60 While a borrower
maintains all claims against the loan originator under the HDC rule,
the originator is often an under-capitalized, "fly-by-night" mortgage
broker or61finance company, against whom the borrower cannot get
recourse.
The story of George and Marjorie Mox illustrates the
unfairness to borrowers that results from application of the HDC
doctrine. 62 The Mox's case was part of a series of lawsuits arising
from the Diamond Mortgage Corporation ("Diamond") mortgagebacked securities fraud.
Prior to their loan agreement with
57 Statement ofMargot Saunders, supra note 13,

at 13-14.

See, e.g., Midfirst Bank, SSB v. C.W. Haynes & Co., Inc., 893 F.Supp.
1304, 1312 (D.S.C. 1994) (applying the HDC defense in a commercial context to
hold that: "Article Three of the UCC controls transfers of negotiable instruments,
and the mortgage notes are clearly negotiable. If UCC Article Three should not
apply in this case and the holder in due course doctrine is no longer warranted, then
any abolishment of that body of law should come from the legislature, not the
court"). See also Eggert, supra note 12, at 560-70 (discussing cases where the
HDC doctrine was applied against consumer mortgage borrowers).
58

59 See Philip S. Porter, The Two Faces of Truth-

in Lending, 12 S. C.

18, 23 (Mar./Apr. 2001).
For example, in a well known treatise on securitization, Jason Kravitt details

LAWYER
60

the efforts that a securitization entity should take to become a Holder in Due
Course. See Eggert, supra note 12, at 566-67.
61 Id. at 508; 522-27; 553-59 (exploring the problem of the "Boom, Bust, and

Bankruptcy Cycle" of predatory lenders through a case study of the Diamond
Mortgage mortgage-backed securities fraud).
62

See Mox v. Jordan, 436 N.W.2d 114 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990). This case was

first discussed by Kurt Eggert, Held Up in Due Course: Predatory Lending,
Securitization, and the Holder in Due Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REv 503,

511 (2002), along with other examples of the unfairness that results from the HDC
doctrine.
63 Diamond Mortgage and A.J. Obie & Associates infamously perpetrated a
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Diamond the Mox's had two senior home mortgages totaling
$12,700. W64 The Mox's refinanced with a new $31,000 mortgage with
Diamond, which was supposed to pay off the Mox's outstanding
mortgages and provide money to the Moxs. 65 Immediately upon
originating the Mox's loan, Diamond recorded the mortgage and
66
assigned it to an investor who paid good value for the mortgage.
However, the Mox's existing mortgages were never paid off, nor did
they receive a single cent from Diamond, which filed for bankruptcy
soon afterwards.6 The Mox's filed a complaint for declaratory relief
requesting the court to discharge the Diamond mortgage by declaring
the mortgage void for lack of consideration. 68 Applying the HDC
doctrine, the Michigan appellate court affirmed the trial court's denial
of declaratory relief, finding that the mortgage was not void against
the defendant-investors because the defendants did not have
knowledge of defenses against the mortgage's validity at the time
they purchased the mortgage. 69 The court's application of the HDC
doctrine left the Moxs with the full cost of Diamond's fraud, in the
form of $43,700 in mortgage debt.
The Moxs' unfair outcome resulted from a "perfect storm"
combination of the HDC doctrine and Diamond's bankruptcy.
Nonetheless, thousands of borrowers are likely to find themselves in
a similar situation given the boom-and-bust cycle of subprime
lenders. 70 According to one author, most of the major subprime
mortgage lenders of the 1990s, with total mortgage-backed securities
issuances of $125 billion, have filed for bankruptcy since the
subprime liquidity crisis of October 1998.71 Mortgages originated by
Ponzi scheme whereby Diamond promised above market-returns to investors in its
mortgages. The returns were paid from funds contributed by later investors, until
the pyramid collapsed. See Eggert, supra note 12, at 522-31. Diamond Mortgage
often engaged in outright theft from potential borrowers, as in the case of the
Mox's. Id. at 524. The company would solicit home equity loans, record
mortgages against the borrowers, immediately sell the mortgage to investors, and
never give the borrowers a dime of their money. Id. at 525.
64

Mox, 436 N.W.2d at 115.

65 Id.
66 Id.
67 id.

68 id.
69

Mox, 436 N.W.2d at 115-16.

70

See Eggert, supra note 12, at 508, 522-7, 553-9.

71

See Erick Bergquist, Preparingfor a Bad-Loan Boom, AM.

BANKER,

Oct. 6,
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these lenders were transferred to investors for value long before the
originators went bankrupt. Without laws to prevent assignees from
claiming the HDC defense, many borrowers of these now bankrupt
finance companies would be stripped of potential claims against their
abusive mortgages.
B. The Case for Elimination of the Holder in Due Course
Doctrine
Throughout much of the twentieth century, the HDC doctrine
was widely applied to consumer retail loan transactions. 72 However,
recognizing the uneven sophistication between borrowers and
lenders, the inequitable outcomes resulting from the rule's
application and the inefficient incentives created by imposing the
costs of abusive lending on borrowers, the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) abrogated the HDC doctrine for buyers of
consumer credit contracts by making the buyer liable for claims and
defenses against the loan seller (the "FTC Holder Rule").73 Consumer
transactions that did not fall within the definition of a "consumer
credit contract," most importantly, residential mortgage transactions,
remained subject to the HDC rule. 74 The same rationales that
motivated the FTC Holder Rule in 1975 motivated the need for
abrogating the HDC rule for assignees of residential mortgages.
The HDC defense is widely recognized to work disastrous
results on mortgage debtors.75 As illustrated by the case of Mr. and
Mrs. Mox, the rule presents the biggest problem when originating
2000, at 1.
72 See Siddartha Venkatesan, Abrogating the Holder in Due Course Doctrine
in Subprime Mortgage Transactionsto more Effectively PolicePredatory Lending,
7 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 177, 211-12 (2003-2004).
73 The FTC expressly stated that the HDC doctrine operated inefficiently
because the assignee was better able than the consumer to protect itself from
abusive retailers and to control the practices of abusive retailers. See id. at 212-14.
As a result, the FTC adopted the Holder Rule, which requires sellers of consumer
credit loans to provide notice to buyers that the buyers may be liable for any claims
or defenses that the borrower has against the seller for an amount up to the amount
paid by the debtor under the credit agreement. 16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (2004). Because
the Holder Rule is crafted as a notice requirement, some courts have interpreted the
rule narrowly. See Venkatesan, supra note 72, at 220.
74 See Jeffrey P. Naimon, Jacob Thiessen & Jennifer Beall, Assignee in
Residential Mortgage Transactions, REV. OF BANKING & FIN. SERVICES, Vol. 19,
No. 3, Mar. 1, 2003, at 89A.
75 Statement of Margot Saunders, supra note 13, at 14.
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lenders disappear or file bankruptcy. Still, this is not the only context
in which the rule works unfairly against consumers. Even if the
originating lender remains in business, a consumer facing foreclosure
by an assignee will still lose his home without defenses against the
assignee. The borrower's ability to separately pursue claims against
the original lender does not provide protection against foreclosure by
the assignee. For example, even if the Moxs could have pursued their
claims for fraud against a non-bankrupt Diamond, the investors could
have pursued foreclosure proceedings independently (and probably
more quickly) given the reasoning of the Mox court. As plainly stated
by William Farris, a lobbyist with AARP, ".

.

. at the end of the day,

if you cannot raise
a claim against the person holding the note, you
76
have no defense.,

Beyond fairness, efficiency similarly demands elimination of
the HDC doctrine. First, between the borrower and the investor, the
sophisticated investor (through the financial institution that executes
the securitization) is the party best able to avoid the harm of a
predatory loan. 77 For one, financial institutions deal repeatedly with
loan originators, giving these institutions the ability to obtain
information to distinguish good from bad lenders. Moreover, the
costs of gathering information about loan originators can be spread
over hundreds of loans purchased from the originating entity. By
contrast, an unsophisticated borrower has limited access to
information about originator quality. It is not necessarily efficient for
each borrower, who will only deal with a mortgage broker or banker
a few times in his lifetime, to spend the costs to gather this
information. Financial institutions are also the better bearers of the
cost of abusive loans because they can contract around liability from
bad loans through recourse agreements or third-party insurance. 8
In addition, the HDC doctrine creates a moral hazard by
allowing mortgage originators to externalize the cost of their
predatory behaviors. 79 As illustrated in Mox, the HDC doctrine
76

Tamara Loomis, Predatory Lending Law Has Investment Firms in Arms,

N.Y. L. J., Mar. 27, 2003, at 1, WESTLAW, 3/27/2003 NYLJ 1, col. 3 (emphasis
added).

See Eggert, supra note 12, at 613-28 (providing an in-depth argument that
the HDC doctrine is inefficient because of the assignee's superior ability to take
precautions against abusive lenders, to innovate mechanisms to avoid or mitigate
risk of abuse, and to respond to assignment of risk).
78 For further discussion of assignees as the least cost avoiders see
77

Venkatesan, supra note 72, at 206-10.
79 The FTC made a similar argument in crafting the Holder Rule.

See
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allows originators to escape liability by transferring the predatory
loan. 80 The individual borrower fully bears the costs of the abuse.
Mortgage brokers already have an incentive to originate high-fee
loans, without consideration of the borrowers' needs or ability to pay,
because the brokers receive up-front compensation and transfer the
loans before they suffer loss from default or liability. The HDC
doctrine creates a vicious cycle of incentives for the other players in
the lending industry by encouraging investors to keep pushing capital
into MBS which pushes investment banks to demand more and more
loans from brokers, who can then push more and more loans onto
borrowers.
Assignee liability eliminates the inefficient incentives created
by the HDC doctrine because it links the parties involved in the
mortgage production process through shared liability. Specifically,
assignee liability forces the party who feeds capital to predatory
mortgage originators to internalize the costs imposed on consumers
by the predatory lender. To avoid the cost, prudent assignees should
engage in due diligence of loan originators and should refuse to
purchase loans from predatory originators, thus eliminating the
ability of predatory lenders to stay in business. As predatory lenders
are cut out of the mortgage origination business, the costs of assignee
liability should be offset by a decreased risk of default, which
benefits borrowers in the form of lower interest rates. 8' At the same
time, the threat of liability should also push back on Wall Street's
demand for subprime mortgages. Thus, to flip the blunt response of
Lehman Brothers' spokesman regarding the role of investment banks
in the subprime market, 82 assignee liability ensures that financiers
such as Lehman Brothers act as both underwriters and regulators to
correct current failures in the pricing and supply of subprime credit.

Venkatesan, supra note 72, at 211-12, n. 190 (citing Preservation of Consumers'
Claims and Defenses, 40 Fed. Reg. at 53,522 to state: "[m]isconduct costs are not
incorporated in the price of goods or services .... [thus] where certain seller
misconduct costs cannot be eliminated from the market we would require that such
costs be internalized, so that prices paid by consumers more accurately reflect the
true social costs of engaging in a credit sale transaction").
80 Mox, 436 N.W.2d at 115-16.
8 The FTC likewise reached a similar conclusion about the effect of assignee
liability on the cost of credit and access to credit in regards to consumer credit
transactions. See Venkatesan, supra note 72, at 214-15.
82 Henriques, supra note 19, at Section 1 Page Al.
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C. Market Adaptations to Assignee Liability
Opponents of assignee liability rally around the HDC doctrine
as a necessary condition to preserve access to capital for subprime
borrowers. 83 To be sure, this assumes that access to the type of credit
84
financed by the secondary market is a benefit to borrowers.
Specifically, lenders argue that the complex process of securitization,
which provides more than two-thirds of the capital funding for the
subprime market, requires predictable and quantifiable risks. The
uncertainty imposed by the risk of liability deters rating agencies
from rating MBS. 85 Accordingly, investors refuse to purchase MBS,
closing access to the subprime market for millions of borrowers in
need.
Lenders point to Georgia's "failed" experiment with
expanded assignee liability as the "poster child" for their case. In
October, 2002, Georgia passed a state anti-predatory lending law, the
Georgia Fair Lending Act (GFLA), which expanded upon federal
anti-predatory lending law. 6 Because the GFLA went so much
further in protecting consumers than any existing federal or state law,
by subjectin, assignees to potentially unlimited liability, the market
overreacted." Lenders refused to originate new loans to Georgia
83

Promoting Home Ownership: Hearingbefore the H. Subcomm. On Housing

and Community Opportunity (2004) (Statement of Bob Ney, Chairman) (stating
that "[i]n a well-intentioned attempt to end abusive lending practices, some state
and local governments passed laws extending liability for fraudulent origination
practices to those in the secondary market that purchase the loan in a pool, but had
no hand in actually writing the loan. These strict assignee liability laws threaten
the availability of credit in the subprime market. Acting as a usury cap on mortgage
lending, these laws effectively prevent people from receiving mortgages").
84 However, as argued throughout this article, consumers would benefit if less
credit were pushed onto them because "destructive credit is worse than no credit at
all." Saunders, supra note 1, at 141.
85 In particular, Standard & Poor's points to punitive damages or aggregated
damages from class action lawsuits as examples of substantial uncertain risks that
cannot be accounted for in forecasting cash flows. See, e.g., Natalie Abrams &
Maureen Colement, STANDARD & POOR'S, STANDARD AND POOR'S ADDRESSES
NEW
JERSEY
PREDATORY
LENDING
LAW
(2003),
http://www.bondmarket.com/regulatory/SP AddressesNJLaw.pdf.
86 GA. CODE ANN. §§ 7-6A-1 to -13 (2004). See also Venkatesan, supra note
72, at 198-200.
87 See, e.g., Standard & Poor's, Press Release: Standard & Poor's to Disallow
Georgia Fair Lending Act (Jan. 16, 2003), http://www.mortgagebankers.org/
industry/news/03/0116b.html; Moody's Investors Service, Press Release: Moody's
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borrowers and rating agencies refused to rate securitizations that
included certain loans originated in Georgia. 88 As a result, some
Georgia residents Were unable to obtain subprime mortgages.
Georgia legislators immediately modified the legislation to respond
to the rating agencies concerns, bringing GFLA's provision for
89
assignee liability in line with existing federal assignee liability law.
Lenders 90and rating agencies immediately "re-opened shop" in
Georgia.
States have since learned from Georgia's "failure," and have
worked more closely with rating agency representatives to define the
standard under which, and the extent to which, assignees should also
be held liable for predatory practices of mortgage originators.91 As a
result, rating agencies have been clear about their continued ability to
rate loans that impose assignee liability. 92 Thus, the mortgage
industry needs a better "poster child" to continue to make the case
against assignee liability. The collective evidence is even more telling
than these particular states' success stories. By the end of 2003,
nineteen states and cities had already passed their own assignee
liability laws. 93 Yet the mortgage industry raved about 2003 as "one
of its best years ever for both originationsgrowth and profits" in the
subprime mortgage business.9 4 Likewise, federal assignee liability
Expands Consideration of Assignee Liability for Residential Mortgages in
Securitizations
(Jan.
30,
2003),
http://www.mortgagebankers.org/
industry/news/03/0130a.pdf.
88 See Venkatesan, supra note 72, at 199-200. See also Standard & Poor's,
supra note 87.
89 Compare GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-6(b) (2004) with 15 U.S.C. § 1641(d)
(2004).
90 See Venkate'san, supra note 72, at 200.
91

Telephone Interview with Debbie Goldstein, Center for Responsible

Lending (Sept. 27, 2004).
92 See, e.g., Standard & Poor's, Press Release: S&P Addresses Amendment to
Maine Truth in Lending Act Will Rate Structured Finance Transactions that
Include Maine Loans (Sept. 12, 2003), http://www.mortgagebankers.org/
industry/news/03/0912d.html.
93 See Standard & Poor's, Press Release: Standard and Poor's Implements
Credit Enhancement Criteria and Revises Representation and Warranty Criteria for
Including Anti-Predatory Lending Law Loans in U.S. Rated Structured Finance
Transactions
(May
13,
2004),
http://www.mbaa.org/industry/
reports/04/sp_0513b.pdf [hereinafter Standard and Poor's Implements Credit
Enhancement Criteria].
94 See Statement of Michael Calhoun, supra note 10, at 3 (citing SMR
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under HOEPA existed for a ten year period during which subprime
mortgage volume grew nearly ten-fold, 95
and subprime mortgagebacked securities volume grew twenty-fold.
The lending industry's doomsday scenario for the subprime
mortgage market has been proved wrong for a simple reason:
securitization entities have access to several structuring tools, or
"credit enhancements," to adapt to assignee liability. A simple credit
enhancement already used in most securitizations involves a recourse
agreement between the securitization entity, which holds the
mortgages for the benefit of investors, and the seller of the
mortgages. 96 Practically, this simple recourse agreement should force
buyers to engage in initial due diligence of the seller with whom they
contract to ensure minimum capital requirements, bonding, or other
guarantees of payment should the securitization entity need to sell a
predatory loan back to the buyer. Securitization entities can also
create more complicated trust structures in which the seller retains the
equity, or first-loss tranche of the pool of securities. 97 Similar to the
recourse agreement, the seller will first bear the cost of "bad loans",
and thus have an incentive to ensure that bad loans do not end up in
the securitization entity's mortgage pool. Thus, credit enhancements
provide sellers with the needed incentive to police the flow of their
capital to honest lenders.
Rating agencies have already successfully turned to credit
enhancements as an adaptation to assignee liability laws. 98 For
example, Standard & Poor's require the seller of loans to provide the
securitization entity with a representation and warranty that the loans
in the pool are not subject to assignee liability, and that the seller has
99
effective procedures for identifying liability-carrying loans.
Research Corporation,

SUBPRIME MORTGAGE LOANS,

(2004)).

95 See supra Part II.A and II.C.
96 See Standard and Poor's Implements Credit Enhancement Criteria, supra
note 93. See also Michael Gregory" If Trusts Were To Break Wide Open: The
Shake-Up in Subprime Lending and Its Impact on ABS, ASSET SALES REPORT, June
26, 2000, available at 2000 WL 3953601.
97 See Home Equity Loan Securitization: Structural Features and Credit
Enhancement, in MORGAN STANLEY HOME EQUITY HANDBOOK, SECTION II, 37112 (2004).
98 See, e.g., Standard & Poor's , Press Release: Standard & Poor's Permits
Additional New Jersey Mortgage Loans Into Rated Single Family Transactions
Available
(Nov. 25, 2003), http://www.mortgagebankers.org/industry/
news/03/1125a.html.
99 Id.
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Standard & Poor's require the representation be provided by a
creditworthy entity, with sufficient capital to repurchase loans that
are in breach of the warranty.' 00 Tellingly, Congress had this simple
credit enhancement in mind when it passed the first assignee liability
provision under federal law. 101

III. Federal Regulation of Predatory Lending
A. The Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994
(HOEPA)
Congress enacted TILA in 1968 to promote informed use of
consumer credit.' 0 2 The statute requires creditors to provide
03
borrowers with standard disclosures regarding the costs of credit.'
However, TILA was not created to respond to the deceptive and
abusive practices which developed specifically in the home-equity
market. 1 4 Accordingly, TILA does not impose any substantive
limitations on the provision of home equity credit or correct any of
the market failures that encourage abusive lending practices.
Recognizing the need to directly address the mounting evidence of
abuses in the home equity lending market, Congress enacted the
Home Ownership Equity Protection Act ("HOEPA") in 1994.105
100 Id.
'0'

See S. REP.No. 103-69, supra note 3, at 28 (stating that "[t]he Committee

expects that establish [sic], trustworthy originators sell their loans by entering into
recourse agreements with the purchasers").
102 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667, Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.
103

Creditors must provide borrowers with a standard disclosure statement that

clearly states the dollar amount financed by the borrower, the cost of financing in
both percentage and dollar terms, and a notice of the consumer's right to rescind
the transaction within three days of settlement. Id. TILA applies to any credit
transaction by a creditor who extends credit (1) to consumers (2) regularly (3)
subject to a finance charge (4) primarily for personal, family, or household
purposes. Id.
104 For this reason, statues such as TILA are typically inadequate to protect
victims of predatory lending. See Deborah Goldstein, Protecting Consumers From
Predatory Lenders: Defining the Problem and Moving Towards Workable
Solutions, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 225, 23 8-45 (2000).
105 Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act, Pub.
L. No. 103-325, § 151-58, 108 Stat. 2160 (1994) (enacted as a part of the federal
Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601- 1649; Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226).
See also S. REP. No. 103-69, supra note 18, at *2, 21. At the time of HOEPA's

Loyola Consumer Law Review

[Vol. 18:2

HOEPA prohibits loans from including certain abusive terms,
and also expands TILA's disclosure requirements. 0 6 Unlike TILA,
which applies to every residential mortgage loan, HOEPA applies
only to a certain class of "High Cost Mortgages."'10 7 HOEPA
provides that a mortgage is High Cost when the mortgage reaches
either an interest rate or a points and fees trigger.10 8 Specifically, the
loan is a "HOEPA loan" or "High Cost Mortgage" if it is:
(1) a consumer credit transaction (2) with a creditor (3) that
is secured by the consumer's principal dwelling and (4) is a
second or subordinate residential mortgage, not a
residential mortgage transaction, a reverse mortgage
transaction, or a transaction under an open credit plan and
(5) that satisfies either of the following two tests:
a) APR Test: the annual percentage rate (APR) of interest
for the loan transaction exceeds the rate for Treasury
securities of a comparable maturity by more than 8%; or,
b) Points and Fees Test: the total "points and fees" payable
by the borrower at or before closing will exceed the greater
of (i) 8% of the total loan amount; or (ii) $400.00.109
To illustrate how "high cost" a HOEPA loan is, consider the
payments on a $100,000 thirty-year mortgage at a prime interest rate
versus the same mortgage at HOEPA's threshold interest rate,
0 The borrower's
currently about 6.0% versus 13.5%, respectively." l
passage, the federal regulatory landscape also included regulations regarding
kickbacks to brokers as part of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act
(RESPA). 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2617 (2004).
106 15 U.S.C. § 1639.
'° Id. See also 15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa) (defining High Cost Mortgage).
Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1631 with 15 U.S.C. § 1639.
108 15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa); 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(a).
109 15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa); 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(a).
See also Cooper v. First
Gov't Mortgage & Investors Corp., 238 F.Supp.2d 50, 62-65 (D.D.C. 2002). The
Federal Reserve Board amended HOEPA in 2001 to reduce the APR trigger from
ten percent to eight percent. See Regulation Z, Final Rule (Dec. 21, 2001), supra
note 7.
110 For current mortgage rates see Mortgage Bankers Association, available at
http://www.mbaa.org/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2005). For current U.S. Treasury
benchmark rates see Federal Reserve Board Statistical Release H. 15 Selected
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monthly payments would be $600 versus $1,145, respectively, with
total interest payments over the thirty-year term of $115,838 versus
$312,348, which constitutes a cost difference of about 200% for the
same buying power today!
In limiting HOEPA's scope to high-cost home equity loans,

Congress sought to target the most abusive sector of the subprime
market."' Unfortunately, Congress was influenced by industry
lobbyists who argued that additional regulation would unnecessarily
close the subprime market to several borrowers. However, the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the "Board") expanded
HOEPA's coverage somewhat in 2001, recognizing the limited
effectiveness of the 1994 Act's initial scope.
Current bills in
Congress, such as the bill proposed by Congressmen Brad Miller,
Mel Watt, and Barney Frank, continue to3 push for additional
protections for borrowers of high cost loans."'
It is illegal for HOEPA loans to contain certain terms, because
these terms create an unreasonable risk of foreclosure when
combined with an already high-cost, high-fee loan. Prohibited terms
include points on loan amounts refinanced, default interest rates
above the pre-default rate, balloon payments, negative amortization,
prepayment penalties, "loan flipping," and extension of credit without
consideration of the borrowers' ability to repay. 114 In addition, the
creditor of a HOEPA loan must provide the borrower with a special
disclosure warning the borrower that he can lose his home if he does

Interest Rates, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/hl5/data.htm
(last visited Nov. 20, 2005. The HOEPA trigger for a first-lien mortgage is eight
points above "the yield on Treasury securities having comparable periods of
maturity to the loan maturity. .. ". 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(a)(1)(i). Because the
federal government stopped issuing thirty-year Treasuries, the Federal Reserve
Board staff has interpreted the Regulation Z trigger language to mean that lenders
should use the yield for twenty-year constant maturities in place of the yield for
thirty-year maturities. See Azmy, supra note 13, at 676-77.
.. S. REP. No. 103-169, supra note 3, at *21.
112 See Regulation Z, Final Rule (Dec. 21, 2001), supra note 7. The Rule
expands the definition of High Cost Mortgage by providing for a lower APR trigger
and a broader definition of costs included in the points and fees trigger. See id.
The Rule also adds a restriction on flipping and asset-based lending. See id.
..
3 See H.R.
1182, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005).
See also
http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/pbOO-MillerWattFrank-0305.pdf
(last
visited Nov. 18, 2005).
114 15 U.S.C. § 1639(c)-(h); 12 C.F.R. § 226.32.
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not meet his obligations under the loan." 5 This warning, along with
the standard TILA disclosures, must be provided to the borrower
three days before loan settlement6 to allow the borrower a "cooling
off' period to evaluate the loan. 11
B. A Dual Scheme for Assignee Liability: Strict Liability or
Negligence
Congress focused on assignee liability as HOEPA's major
enforcement mechanism. The negative effects of the HDC doctrine
on the subprime mortgage market were well recognized at the time of
HOEPA's passage:
[In the past,] [u]nscrupulous lenders were limited ...by
their own capital resources. Today, however, with loans
sold on a regular basis, one unscrupulous player can create
havoc in a community by selling loans as fast as they are
originated. 117
Thus, HOEPA's drafters intended assignee liability to
encourage the secondary market to provide the needed "policing" 118
of
unscrupulous mortgage originators in the primary market.
Accordingly, HOEPA's drafters used broad language that makes an
assignee liable for "all claims and defenses" that the consumer could
assert against the "creditor."' 1 9 However, this broad cause of action
"' Id. § 1639(a) (stating that "the creditor shall provide the following
disclosures in conspicuous type size: If you obtain this loan, the lender will have a
mortgage on your home. You could lose your home, and any money you have put
into it, if you do not meet your obligations under the loan").
116 15 U.S.C. § 1639(b).

...S.REP. No. 103-169, supra note 3, at *28.
118Id.

(noting that "[b]y imposing assignee liability, the Committee seeks to
ensure that the High Cost Mortgage market polices itself ....
Providing assignee
liability will halt the flow of capital to such lenders").
1'9 15 U.S.C. § 1641(d)(1).

Any person who purchases or is otherwise assigned a mortgage referred
to in section 1602 (aa) of this title shall be subject to all claims and
defenses with respect to that mortgage that the consumer could assert
against the creditor of the mortgage, unless the purchaser or assignee
demonstrates, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a reasonable
person exercising ordinary due diligence, could not determine, based on
the documentation required by this subchapter, the itemization of the
amount financed, and other disclosure of disbursements that the
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against assignees is limited by a "safe harbor" for diligent assignees
and a cap on damages for all assignees. As a result, HOEPA's
assignee liability provisions come together to create a dual scheme
for seeking remedies from assignees, based alternatively on
negligence or strict liability.
Under HOEPA, an assignee of a predatory loan may be liable
either on a theory of negligence or strict liability. Specifically, section
1641(d) combined with section 16390) / 1635(b) create this dual
remedial scheme. First, section 1641(d) imposes capped monetary
damages on negligent assignees. Assignees who meet HOEPA's
required showing of reasonable due diligence are protected by the
statute's safe harbor. Second, HOEPA imposes strict liability for
certain violations and gives borrowers the right to rescind their
predatory loan under section 16390) / section 1635(b).
1) Negligence [section 1641(d)]:
HOEPA gives borrowers a private right of action for damages
against assignees of predatory High Cost Mortgages. 20 However, an
assignee can protect itself from liability for damages by "exercising
ordinary due diligence" to avoid the purchase of a High Cost
Mortgage ("HOEPA's Safe Harbor"). 12 1 For a violation of one of
section 1639's disclosure or substantive requirements, the borrower is
entitled to collect actual damages, attorneys fees, and all finance
charges paid by the consumer from the assignee. 122 For a violation of
any other cause of action against the assignee, HOEPA limits the
borrower's damages to the sum of the borrower's remaining
paid by the borrower in
indebtedness plus the total amount
23
transaction.1
the
with
connection
2) Strict Liability Isection 1639(j) / section 1635(b)]:
Alternatively, HOEPA gives borrowers a right to rescind a
predatory High Cost Mortgage against an assignee if the loan violates
mortgage was a mortgage referred to in section 1602 (aa) of this title.
The preceding sentence does not affect rights of a consumer under
subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section or any other provision of this
subchapter. (emphasis added).
120 15 U.S.C. § 1641(d)(1).
121 id.
122

Id. § 1641(d)(2)(A).

123

Id. § 1641(d)(2)(B).
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HOEPA. 2 4 Under the rescission remedy the borrower cancels the
loan agreement and is "not liable for any finance or other charge"
associated with the loan. 125 The lender is forced to terminate its
security interest in the borrower's home upon repayment of the
outstanding principal balance by the borrower. 26 While the main
purpose behind the damage remedy under negligence is to enforce
HOEPA's disclosure and substantive provisions, the rescission
remedy was codified for an additional purpose, to give homeowners a
means to "unburden themselves of security interests exacted by
[unscrupulous sales] tactics."' 127 Accordingly, a borrower's right to
rescission is completely unaffected by transfer of the High Cost
Mortgage to an assignee, even where the assignee exercises the
requisite due diligence. 2 8 The borrower's right to rescind against the
124

Id. § 1639(j) (stating

126

Id. at § 1635(b).

that

any

violation of HOEPA's

disclosure
requirements or its substantive prohibitions constitute a "failure to deliver material
disclosures," which triggers TILA's rescission remedy). The rescission remedy is
sometimes an alternative to damages because several courts have held that where a
borrower rescinds the mortgage, the borrower no longer has any further recoverable
damages. See In Re Murray, 239 B.R. 728, 735 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1999) (citing In
re Steinbrecher, 110 B.R. 155, 159-60 (Bkrtcy. E.D. Pa. 1990)). However, where
there is no "overlap" between the HOEPA claims and the state law claims, a
borrower is entitled to both rescission and damages. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(g)
(stating that a court may award relief in addition to rescission for violations of
TILA); Cf Murray, 239 B.R. at 735 (citing In re Brown, 134 B.R. 134, 146 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1991) accepting that TILA rescission eliminates a claim for actual damages
under state law where state law and TILA claims "overlap").
125 15 U.S.C. § 1635.
See Bryant v. Mortgage Capital Res. Corp., 197 F.Supp.2d 1357, 1363
(N.D. Ga. 2002) (citing Sellers v. Wollman, 510 F.2d 119, 123 (5th Cir. 1975))
(stating that "[t]he purpose of making creditors civilly liable is to force disclosure
of credit terms. The purpose of according borrowers [entering into specified
transactions] a right of rescission is broader; not only is it designed to compel
disclosure, but it also serves to blunt unscrupulous sales tactics by giving
homeowners a means to unburden themselves of security interests exacted by such
tactics").
128 See 15 U.S.C. § 1641(c) (stating that "[a]ny consumer who has the right to
rescind a transaction under section 1635 of this title may rescind the transaction as
against any assignee of the obligation"); 15 USC § 1641(d) (stating that safe harbor
does not affect a consumer's right to rescission under 1641(c)). See also Stone v.
Mehlberg, 728 F.Supp. 1341, 1348 (W.D. Mich. 1989) (citing S. REP. No. 96-368,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 32- 33, reprintedin 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 236, 268 to state that
section 1641(c) was added by Congress to "eliminate ambiguity on the question of
assignee liability for rescission by stating explicity [sic] that a consumer's exercise
of this right is effective against an assignee," even when no violation is apparent on
127
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creditor or assignee extends three years from the date of loan
origination. 129
Rescission can be a powerful remedy for borrowers who have
access to refinancing.' 30 To illustrate, consider a borrower who
rescinds after two years a $100,000 High Cost Mortgage at a 14.0%
interest rate, which included $5,000 in origination and other fees.
Upon rescission, the borrower's total monthly payments of $28,436,
plus the $5,000 in upfront fees are offset against the original
$100,000 loan. The borrower is then obligated to the lender for
$71,563. Since the rescission remedy entitles the borrower to full
credit against the loan principal for all payments made to the lender
up to the date of rescission, the borrower effectively gets the benefit
of two years worth of no-interest financing. Moreover, the borrower
is freed from any prepayment penalties or other costs from
refinancing into a more suitable mortgage.
IV. HOEPA's Expansion of the Borrower's Right of
Action Against Assignees
A. Comprehensive Market-Based Mechanism for Policing the
High Cost Mortgage Market
HOEPA was the first statutory provision to create a
comprehensive right of action against assignees of residential
mortgages. A very limited provision for assignee liability existed
within section 1641 (a) of TILA prior to HOEPA's passage. However,
the provision was expanded in significant ways under HOEPA to
fashion assignee liability as a substantial enforcement mechanism for
3
anti-predatory lending laws against High Cost Mortgages.' '
First, HOEPA expands the universe of predatory lending
the face of the document presented to the assignee).
129 15 U.S.C. §§ 1635(f), 1635(i). See Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 118 S.Ct.
1408, 1409 (1998) (holding that section 1635(f) "completely extinguishes" any
right to rescind after the three-year statute of limitations period, including rights to
rescind that arise as a defense in the nature of recoupment or set-off).
130 Community development financial institutions such as Self-Help,
http://www.self-help.org/, have home loan programs through which borrowers can
obtain such refinancings.
131 Compare 1641(a) with 1641(d)(1); Cf. Cooper v. First Gov't Mortgage &
Investors Corp., 2002 WL 31520158, at *56 (D.D.C. Nov. 4, 2002) (interpreting
the meaning of HOEPA's safe harbor by comparing it to the existing language in
TILA's safe harbor).
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violations for which assignees are derivatively liable. Under TILA,
an assignee is only liable for a creditor's violations of TILA itself; the
assignee is not liable for a creditor's violations of other federal or
state laws.132 In contrast, assignees of High Cost Mortgages are
"subject to all claims and defenses, whether under Truth in Lending
133
law or other law that could be raised against the original lender."'
Second, section 1641(d)(1) imposes a higher duty of due
diligence on assignees who seek exemption from liability in the form
of a "safe harbor."' 134 Under section 1641(a) of TILA, assignees are
only liable for lending violations "apparent on the face of the [TILA]
disclosure statement" (the "TILA Safe Harbor"). 135 Congress
narrowed the safe harbor for High Cost Mortgages by requiring that
an assignee demonstrate, "by a preponderance of the evidence, that a
reasonable person exercising ordinary due diligence, could not
determine, based on the documentation required by this subchapter,
the itemization of the amount financed, and other disclosure of
disbursements that the mortgage
was a [High Cost Mortgage] (the
36
'HOEPA Safe Harbor.')"1

Thus, HOEPA arguably places a greater burden on assignees
to review not just the particular loan documents in a given High Cost
Mortgage transaction, but to scrutinize the parties who played a role
in originating the mortgage to ensure that these parties did not engage
in any abusive practices.l-37
15 U.S.C. § 1641(a) (stating that "any civil action for a violation of this
subchapter.., which may be brought against a creditor may be maintained against
any assignee" (emphasis added)).
131 S. REP. No. 103-69, supra note 3, at *28 (emphasis added).
134 The "safe harbor" refers to a provision which provides an exemption from
liability for assignees who engage in due diligence of the loans they purchase.
Both TILA and HOEPA contain a "safe harbor" for diligent assignees, but apply a
different standard to evaluate diligence. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1641(a) [TILA Safe
Harbor] with 15 U.S.C. § 1641(d)(1) [HOEPA Safe Harbor].
132

"' 15 U.S.C. § 1641(a). Section 1641(a) appears to have been somewhat of a
compromise between the common law Holder in Due Course Doctrine and needed
consumer protections at the time of TILA's passage.
136 15 U.S.C. § 1641(d)(1). See also Cooper, 2002 WL 31520158 at *55
(stating that "[i]n contrast to the apparent on the face standard, Congress intended
to subject high cost mortgage (HOEPA loan) assignees to a more expansive
standard of liability than provided pursuant to TILA").

13 C.f Cooper, 2002 WL 31520158 at *56 (stating that "[t]he comparison
[between section 1641(d)(1) and § 1641(a)] demonstrates that ordinary due
diligence must require at least more than a mere review of relevant loan documents
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Third, HOEPA expands an assignee's "regulatory" role by
imposing liability for the predatory practices of both lenders and
brokers. Like TILA, HOEPA imposes liability on assignees for the
claims and defenses that the borrower could assert against the
"creditor." However, HOEPA defines "creditor" more broadly than
TILA. A HOEPA "creditor" includes any person who originates two
or more High Cost Mortgages in a twelve month period, or any
person who originates one or more High Cost Mortgages through a
mortgage broker. 139 By contrast, TILA applies only to a person who
"regularly" extends credit, and to whom the debt is initially
payable. X0 Therefore, while TILA only regulates the actual providers
of credit,' 4 ' HOEPA also regulates entities that originate and/or
solicit High Cost Mortgages. When combined with the assignee
liability provision, HOEPA's new definition of "creditor" means that
assignees of High Cost Mortgages are liable for lending abuses of
mortgage brokers and finance companies, even if these entities do not
extend credit to the borrower. This result is critical to HOEPA's
enforcement scheme because of the substantial, and often abusive,
role that mortgage
brokers play in marketing and originating
r4 2
loans.
subprime
B. Liability Against Assignees for "All Claims and Defenses"
HOEPA's most substantial expansion of assignee liability is
the Act's applicability to claims or defenses arising under any source
of law. HOEPA's plain language explicitly entitles borrowers to sue
assignees for "all claims or defenses" that the assignee could raise
against the original creditor, regardless of the source of the claim

and disbursements). See supra Part V.B.
138 S. REP. No. 103-69, supra note 3,at *25 (HOEPA includes a more
expansive definition of creditor "to prevent brokers from evading the legislation by
matching each borrower with a different private individual acting as a lender").
139 15 U.S.C. § 1602(0.
140 Id.

See, e.g., Robey-Harcourt v. Bencorp Fin. Co., Inc., 212 F. Supp. 2d 1332,
1334 (W.D. Okla. 2002) (dismissing TILA claims against mortgage brokers
because they are not creditors within the meaning of TILA).
141

142

See Curbing Predatory Home Mortgage Lending, supra note 5, at 81-84.

See also Eggert, supra note 12, at 553 (noting that over sixty percent of subprime
loans are originated by brokers).
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against the original creditor. 143 HOEPA's unambiguous language
distinguishes
section 1641(d)
from
the
already-existing
section 1641(a) under TILA, which only imposes assignee liability
for a "civil actionfor a violation of this title."'144 Thus, in contrast to
claims pursuant to the pre-1994 statute, claims under the 1994 statute
may be brought against an assignee based on any violation of TILA,
other federal lending laws, or even state lending laws.
The legislative history surrounding HOEPA's passage clearly
supports a broad scope of assignee liability. The Senate Report on
HOEPA expressly states that section 1641(d) will impose liability on
assignees for all of the original lender's violations of federal and state
lending laws. 145 Drawing on products liability law, the Senate Report
reflects the understanding that all parties involved in placing a
"defective" mortgage into the stream of commerce must be held
liable as a mechanism for ensuring that the mortgage is "safe" for
consumer borrowers. In addition, the Senate Report explains that
HOEPA's assinee liability provision is intended to "mirror" the FTC
Holder Rule.4 As explained in well-reasoned dicta by the court in
Pulphus v. Sullivan, Congress' intent in mirroring the Holder Rule
was to expand assignee liability to cover all claims and defenses
independent of their source of law:
The plain language of the statute and its legislative history,
however, suggest that [section 1641(d)(1)] makes assignees
liable for the original lender's violations of state
law.. .The Senate Report says that the provision...
"mirrors a rule promulgated by the Federal Trade
Commission for 'consumer installment' loans." That FTC
rule, called the holder rule, subjects holders of consumer
credit contracts "to all claims and defenses which the
debtor could assert against the seller of [the] goods or
services." The holder rule, the FTC explained, applies "to
all claims or defenses connected with the transaction,
whether in tort or contract. When, under state law, a
consumer would have a tort claim against the seller that
would defeat a seller's right to further payments or allow
141

See 1641(d). See also S. REP. No. 103-69.

144 15 U.S.C. § 1641(a) (emphasis added).
141
146

See S. REP. No. 103-69, supra note 3, at *28.
Id. See also Pulphus v. Sullivan, No. 02 C 5794, 2003 WL 1964333, at *21

(N.D. Ill. Apr. 28, 2003).
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the consumer to recover ' affirmatively,
this claim is
14 7
holder."
the
against
preserved
While only a few courts have considered this same question,
the Northern District of Georgia reached a similar conclusion to the
Pulphus Court, holding that section 1641(d) resulted in joint and

several liability for all4 parties involved in originating andfinancing a
High Cost Mortgage.'

Notwithstanding, some courts have limited an assignee's
liability under HOEPA's section 1641(d) by holding that the section
does not apply to a creditor's violations of federal and state laws
aside from HOEPA itself.149 These courts rely on the argument that
HOEPA "merely abrogates" the HDC defense and thus does not

141Pulphus, No. 02 C 5794, 2003 WL 1964333, at *21 n.1 1 (internal citations
omitted).
148 Bryant v. Mortgage Capital Res. Corp., 197 F.Supp.2d 1357, 1364-65

(N.D. Ga. 2002). See also In re Barber, 266 B.R. 309, 320 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2001)
(holding that 1641(d) imposes liability on assignee of High Cost Mortgage for
borrower's claims pursuant to Pennsylvania's unfair trade practices act).
149See Bank of N.Y. v. Heath, No. 98-CH-8721, 2001 WL 1771825,
at *2-3
(Ill. Ct. Cl. Oct. 26, 2001) (barring RESPA and state law fraud claims against
assignee); Murray v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 239 B.R. 728, 736 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1999) (asserting that it is unlikely that 1641(d) could "ever sweep [RESPA]
liability onto an assignee); Dowdy v. First Metro. Mortgage Co., No. 01C7211,
2002 WL 745851, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 29, 2002) (barring state law fraud claim
against assignee). Cf Dash v. Firstplus Home Loan Trust 1996-2, No. 1:01 CV
00923, 2003 WL 1038355 at *10 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 6, 2003) (stating that "[b]y its
terms, section 1641(d)... only affects.., the 'holder in due course' defense,
which a defendant assignee might raise against the holder of their loan'). See also
Harvey v. EMC Mortgage Corp., No. Civ. A. 02- 1386, 2003 WL 21460063, at *7
(Bankr.. E.D. Pa. 2003) (stating that "I also refuse to hold, as it appears the Heath
court did and as the Defendants argue here, that § 1641(d)(1) only results in
creating assignee liability if the law under which the claim was asserted provides
for assignee liability. To do so renders § 1641(d)(1) superfluous and undercuts the
legislative intention to hold purchasers of high cost loans liable for the infractions
of the originators of the loan"); Pulphus v. Sullivan, No. 02 C 5794, 2003 WL
1964333, at *21 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 28, 2003) (highlighting the split among courts
regarding whether section 1641(d) also applies to the original lender's violations of
state law and non-HOEPA federal laws). A similar conflict in the case law has
occurred regarding the scope of the FTC Holder Rule. Certain courts hold that the
Holder Rule merely provides consumers with rights that he or she would have
under state law while other courts hold that the Holder Rule creates an affirmative
claim against any assignee regardless of the consumer's rights under state law. See
Venkatesan, supra note 72, at 221.

184

Loyola Consumer Law Review

[Vol. 18:2

150
create a cause of action that did not exist in the underlying law.
Since the underlying laws generally apply only to violations by the
originating creditor, these courts reason that section 1641(d) cannot
be used to hold the assignee liable.
There are several problems with the "mere abrogation"
interpretation of section 1641(d). Most obviously, the plain language
of section 1641(d) does not make any reference to abrogation of the
HDC doctrine. Rather, it contains broad language giving borrowers a
right against assignees for "all claims and defenses" that could have
been brought against the creditor.151 The "mere abrogation"
interpretation of section 1641(d) also contradicts the structure of the
provision, which sets up a two-prong system for measuring damages
against assignees. In particular, section 1641(d)(2) provides one
formula for calculating damages with respect to a violation of
HOEPA, and a separate calculation for damages with respect to "all
other causes of action." 152 Thus, section 1641 (d)'s structure presumes
that liability would be imposed by section 1641(d) on assignees for
non-HOEPA causes of action. 15 Finally, the "mere abrogation"

150 Bank of N.Y., No. 98-CH-8721,
2001 WL 1771825, at *2 (citing
Vandenbroeck v. Contimortgage Corp., 53 F. Supp. 2d 965, 968 (W.D. Mich.
1999)).
15 1 As asserted by the Secretary of the Federal Trade Commission in response
to a proposed amendment to section 1641(d): "The Board proposes a new comment
that would 'clarify' that assignees of HOEPA loans are subject to all claims and
defenses, including but not limited to violations of TILA and HOEPA, that the
borrower could bring against the originating creditor. However, because the
Commission believes that the existing law clearly establishes this principle, it is an
unnecessary addition to the HOEPA commentary. The statutory language is
unambiguous-an assignee is subject to 'all claims and defenses."' Letter from
Donald S. Clark to Jennifer J. Johnson (Mar. 9, 2001), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/be/v010004.htm. It is not clear why the Board rejected the
proposed clarification of § 1641(d). However, the Board certainly must have
considered the substantial risk that the proposed clarification would have created
difficulties and uncertainty surrounding enforcement of claims against assignees by
pre-clarification borrowers. As further asserted by the Secretary of the Federal
Trade Commission: "[T]he proposed 'clarification' could potentially complicate
the Commission's efforts to enforce HOEPA against secondary market purchasers.
Assignees might argue that' the Board's action suggests that, prior to the
'clarification,' the law was unclear on this issue and, thus, assignees who
previously purchased HOEPA loans should not be held liable." Id. Arguably, the
proposed clarification posed an unnecessary risk given § 1641(d)'s alreadyunambiguous language.
152 15 U.S.C. § 164 1(d)(2).
153

HOEPA itself does not include punitive or treble damages.

Arguably,
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interpretation also disregards Congress' specific purpose in
expanding assignee liability under HOEPA
to encourage self54
market.'
Mortgage
Cost
High
the
of
policing
Section 1641(d)'s drafters were attuned to failings in the
existing lending laws because the laws were easily circumvented by
the HDC defense.' 55 For this reason, HOEPA's drafters used broad,
unqualified language in section 1641(d). An interpretation that
qualifies section 1641(d) by giving borrowers "all claims and
defenses [arising under HOEPA]" limits the provision beyond its

plain language, its legislative intent, and its underlying policy.
C. A Narrower Safe Harbor: The Assignee's Duty of Due
Diligence

HOEPA expands assignee liability in a second significant way
by imposing a higher duty of due diligence on assignees who seek
exemption from liability through the statute's safe harbor. 156 In
particular, HOEPA only exempts assignees of High Cost Mortgages
from liability when the assignee engages in ordinary due diligence of
all documentation surrounding the mortgage's origination, and based
on this due diligence, concludes that the mortgage is not High Cost.
To the extent the assignee knowingly, or negligently, purchases a
High Cost Mortgage, the assignee remains liable for predatory

HOEPA's drafters included section 1641(d)(2)'s cap to protect assignees against
punitive or treble damages available under certain state laws. Cf Murray, 239 B.R.
at 733 (applying section 1641(d)(2) to foreclose additional damages on claims
brought by debtor under state and non-HOEPA federal law). Still, it is possible
that section 1641 (d)(2)'s two-part structure may be interpreted only to provide an
additional limit, or maximum liability, for those states that do choose to pass their
own laws imposing liability on assignees.
154 See S. REP. No. 103-69, supra note 3, at *28.
155 See Harvey v. EMC Mortgage Corp., No. Civ .A. 02- 1386, 2003 WL

21460063, at *7 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. June 9, 2003) (citing 139 Cong. Rec. S 5705-06
at 5711 (1993), HOEPA co-sponsor Senator D'Amato: "[u]nfortunately, current
laws-the Real Estate Settlement and Procedure Act [RESPA] and Truth in
Lending--do not provide adequate protection for consumers and borrowers in the
second mortgage market. The con artists exploit these gaps to the financial and
emotional detriment of our constituents and our communities").
156 Compare § 1641(d) with § 1641(a). See also Cooper v. First Gov't
Mortgage & Investors Corp., F. Supp. 2d 50, 56'(D.D.C. 2002) (stating that "[i]n
contrast to the apparent on the face standard, Congress intended to subject high cost
mortgage (HOEPA loan) assignees to a more expansive standard of liability than
provided pursuant to TILA").
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lending violations associated with the mortgage.' 57 Thus, the
expanded due diligence requirement creates an incentive for buyers
to more fully investigate the seller's origination practices to ensure
that the mortgage was originated in accordance with all lending laws.
Alternatively, the safe harbor encourages assignees to completely
abstain from purchasing High Cost Mortgages.
There is limited case law interpreting or applying the stricter
safe harbor under HOEPA. A prevailing interpretation of HOEPA's
ordinary due diligence standard was provided in Cooper, which held
on a motion for summary judgment that ordinary due diligence under
HOEPA requires: (1) review of documentation required by Truth-inLending Act, itemization of amount financed, and other disclosure of
disbursements; (2) analysis of these items; and (3) whatever further
58
inquiry is objectively reasonablegiven the results of the analysis.
In Cooper, the assignee moved for summary judgment under
section 1641(d)'s safe harbor, arguing that the loan's HOEPA status
was not determinable based on reasonable due diligence.' 59 The court
denied the assignee's motion because the assignee's corporate
designee had a poor understanding of HOEPA. The court reasoned
that it could not have reasonably evaluated and analyzed the
borrower's loan documents for HOEPA status. 16 Still, Cooper was
only a decision to allow the borrower to proceed against the assignee
at the summary judgment stage. Thus, it remains unsettled how future
courts will apply this broader test announced in Cooper, or some
alternative standard of due diligence.
At least one other court has implied that HOEPA's due
diligence standard is much narrower than the three-part standard
pronounced in Cooper.16 1 Specifically, in Jenkins v. Mercantile
Mortgage Company, the court exempted the assignee of a High Cost
Mortgage from liability based solely on the information in the
62
fraudulent loan documents provided to the assignee by the seller.
117 15 U.S.C. § 1641(d). Sellers of High Cost loans are required to notify
buyers of the risk of assignee liability. Id. at § 1641(d)(4) (requiring that "[a]ny
person who sells or otherwise assigns a mortgage referred to in section 1602(aa) of
this title shall include a prominent notice of the potential liability under this
subsection as determined by the Board").
158 Cooper, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 56 (emphasis added).
159 Id.

160

Id. at 57.

161

Id. at 56.

162

Jenkins v. Mercantile Mortgage Co., 231 F.Supp.2d 737, 746-47 (N.D. Ill.
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Ms. Jenkins sued Provident Bank, the assignee of her mortgage.
claiming violations under federal and state predatory lending laws.
Ms. Jenkins' $92,000 home-improvement loan included over $9,200
of pre-paid finance charges, which clearly placed the loan within
HOEPA's scope. 164 However, in assigning the loan to Provident

Bank, the original lender materially altered the documents disclosing
Ms. Jenkins' finance charges, such that Ms. Jenkins' loan did not
appear to meet HOEPA's points and fees trigger. 165 Without
discussion of HOEPA's ordinary due diligence requirement, the
Jenkins court held that Provident Bank could not be liable on these
facts because Provident Bank could not determine that Ms. Jenkins
loan was High Cost on the face of the documents that it had
received.1 66 Moreover, the court rejected Ms. Jenkins' argument that
Provident Bank should have been placed on notice that further due
diligence was necessary based on discrepancies between the
documents Provident Bank received and those that Ms. Jenkins
received. 167
Clearly, the Jenkins court's interpretation of ordinary due
diligence cannot be correct. Such a reading creates a strong incentive
for originators to disguise loans. Not surprising in the face of
decisions like Jenkins, disguising of High Cost loans has recently
been recognized as a problem in the secondary market. 168 At the same
time, the Jenkins decision encourages assignees to know as little as
possible about the parties with whom they contract. Accordingly,
industry lawyers have already recognized the benefit to their lending
clients, which can be achieved by distancing themselves from
originators. For example, in a 1997 Banking Law Journal on
"Dealing with Mortgage Brokers," the author advises:
an extremely cautious lender may wish to establish as many
barriers as possible between itself and its brokers. It can
avoid closing loans in its own name; it can exercise less
control over the origination process whether in
2002).
163

Id. at 743.

164 Id.
165 Id.
166

Id. at 746-47.

167

Jenkins, 231 F. Supp. 2d at 746-47.

168

See Gregory, supra note 96.
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underwriting, pricing, or documentation; it can avoid
pricing schemes that encourage or allow "overages" for its
broker's salespeople; it can establish its own internal
monitoring program for broker originated loans; it can
avoid table funding relationships altogether.'69
The latter part of this advice, altered pricing schemes and
monitoring programs, is a desirable and intended response to
section 1641(d)'s expanded due diligence requirement. However,
decisions such as Jenkins are more likely to encourage assignees to
follow the former advice as well, establishing as many barriers as
possible between themselves and their originators, thus encouraging
abusive behavior to occur below the lender's radar.
Interpretations of HOEPA's safe harbor that focus only on
due diligence of the actual documentation provided to the assignee,
as in Jenkins, are insufficient because they allow the sneakiest
violators off the hook. 170 These interpretations do not capture
HOEPA's suggested intent "to encourage investors in the secondary
market for HOEPA loans to more carefully scrutinize the
backgrounds and qualifications of those with whom they choose to
do business." 17' Thus, given Congress' clear intent to create a stricter
due diligence standard than existed under TILA, the three-part
standard announced in Cooper is arguably more appropriate. In
applying the standard, due diligence under HOEPA should require a
reasonable inquiry into the background and qualifications of the
mortgage seller, such that it is reasonable for the assignee to rely on
the documentation provided in making the HOEPA determination.

V.

Limitations to Assignee Liability Under HOEPA

A. Limitations to Under the Current Statute
HOEPA was the first attempt by any federal or state
legislature to implement assignee liability for subprime home equity
loans. As such, the statute's drafters sought to balance the competing
169

Mazzagetti, supra note 42, at 926.

170

Cf Eggert, supra note 12, at 591-92 (criticizing HOEPA for failing to

provide protections against intentionally deceitful brokers and lenders and
concluding that "HOEPA primarily deters the honest predatory lender").
171 See Bryant v. Mortgage Capital Res. Corp., 197 F.Supp.2d 1357, 1365
(N.D. Ga. 2002) (emphasis added).
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needs of borrowers and the demands of lenders. Thus, although
HOEPA expands assignee liability, the Act has several limitations
that result from the drafters' balancing of competing interests.
HOEPA has received some criticism from consumer
172
advocates for not going far enough to fight predatory lending.
Foremost, this is a criticism of HOEPA's triggers, which are either
set far above market interest rates, 173 or are incredibly difficult to
calculate, 74 and therefore only capture a small percentage of the

subprime home equity loan market.' 75 More specifically with regard
to assignee
limitations:

liability,

the

statute

contains

several

significant

damages and three(1) A one-year statute of limitations for
1 76
rescission;
for
limitations
of
year statute
(2) HOEPA's strict liability rescission remedy only applies to
violations of HOEPA, rather than to "all claims and defenses"
for the damages remedy; 177 and
172

See Saunders, supra note 1, at 128-29.

Id. at 129 (highlighting HOEPA's high triggers as on of three main
problems with the statute).
174 E-mail Interview with Tara Twomey, Esq., Hale and Dorr Legal Services
171

Center (Nov. 17, 2004) (explaining that calculation of HOEPA's points and fees
trigger is so complex and unclear that there are probably only a few attorneys in the
country who can do the calculation). See also Bostic v. Am. Gen. Fin., Inc., 87 F.
Supp. 2d 611, 616 n.ll (S.D. W. Va. 2000) (accepting statement of borrower's
attorney that no other attorney in the state of West Virginia sufficiently understood
TILA and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act to aid him in litigating the case, thus
necessitating that he bring in counsel from out of state).
...See Regulation Z, Final Rule (Dec. 21, 2001), supra note 7 (noting that
data compiled by the Office of Thrift Supervision in 2001 indicated that the
Board's 2001 amendment of Regulation Z would expand HOEPA's coverage to
include 5% (or about $15 billion of the current $332 billion) of subprime loans).
176 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (2000) (setting a one-year statute of limitations on
affirmative actions for damages under § 1641(d)(2)). 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f) (2000)
(setting a three-year statute of limitations for rescission). The one-year limitation
does not bar HOEPA claims for damages asserted defensively by recoupment or
set-off. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e). However, the three-year limitation on rescission does
bar HOEPA claims asserted defensively by recoupment or set-off. Beach v. Ocwen
Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410, 417-18 (1998).
177 Section 1639(j) deems any violation of section 1639's substantive
protections for High Cost Mortgages a "failure to deliver the material
disclosures ... for the purpose of section § 1635," which entitles the borrower to
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(3) HOEPA's
augmented due diligence requirement is
78
ambiguous.
In part, these limitations resulted unintentionally from
sloppily drafting HOEPA within TILA's existing structural and
remedial scheme. At the same time, the limitations were intentional
compromises between advocates for borrowers and lenders. Either
way, these limitations, along with HOEPA's very high triggers, have
combined to leave few borrowers with the ability to take advantage
79
of the rights created by HOEPA's assignee liability provisions.'

VI. Alternative Bases of Assignee Liability Under State

Law
Newly-enacted state anti-predatory lending statutes and recent
decisions under state common law provide alternatives for holding
assignees liable for the predatory practices of loan originators.
However, state law bases for assignee liability claims may also be
limited because of federal preemption.

section 1635's rescission remedy. However, statutory protections against predatory
lending which are not part of HOEPA (e.g. RESPA, ECOA, or other laws enacted
by the Board, the OCC, the OTS, or other federal agencies) are nowhere deemed a
"failure to deliver material disclosures." As a result, HOEPA's rescission remedy
does not apply to these statutory protections. Arguably, this was a drafting mistake
created by structuring HOEPA as an amendment to TILA.
178 See infra Part V.B. This ambiguity is layered onto an already confusing
statutory scheme. For example, TILA's rescission remedy combined with TILA's
safe harbor for assignees is itself confusing, leading some courts to erroneously
apply TILA's safe harbor against a borrower's claim for rescission against an
assignee. See Pulphus v. Sullivan, No. 02 C 5794, 2003 WL 1964333, at *15-16
(N.D. Ill. Apr. 28, 2003) (noting the court's disagreement with Coleman v.
Equicredit Corp. of Am., No. 01 C 2130, 2002 WL 88750 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 22, 2002)
in applying safe harbor to protect "innocent" assignee from borrower's right to
exercise rescission).
179 A search of WESTLAW's database for all federal and state cases in which
borrowers of High Cost Mortgages brought claims against assignees pursuant to
section 1641(d) in November 2004 returned only twenty-six published and
unpublished cases over the statute's ten-year history. Given an estimated $15
billion in High Cost Mortgages outstanding, see infra note 175 , and widespread
assignment and abuse in the subprime market, see supra Part II.A, there seems to
be a clear problem of under enforcement of HOEPA.

2005]

Extending Liabilityfor PredatorySubprime Loans

191

A. Assignee Liability for High Cost Loans Under State Statutory
Law
HOEPA has been expanded by more recent anti-predatory
legislation at the state level. 18 State statues generally model HOEPA
by carving out a category of high cost mortgages, and then enhance
or supplement HOEPA's regulatory scheme for mortgages covered
by the statute. I8 1 At least twenty-three states and localities have
introduced anti-predatory lending legislation that includes a provision
for assignee liability.1 82 Most notably, New Jersey, New Mexico and
Illinois have passed legislation that provides more expansive rights
for borrowers against assignees. 183 These more debtor-protective state
statutes provide one alternative for establishing liability against
assignees of predatory loans. However, like HOEPA, the state
statutes apply only to a subcategory of high-cost subprime mortgages.
The New Jersey Home Ownership Security Act of 2002 (the
"New Jersey Act"), provides an example of one of the more
carefully-crafted
state
assignee
liability
laws.'1 84
First,
section 46:1 OB-27 provides for full assignee liability unless the
purchaser shows that it exercised reasonable due diligence in
determining whether the loan was high cost. 185 This forces negligent
180

Telephone Interview with Debbie Goldstein, Center for Responsible

Lending (Sept. 27, 2004).
181 Id.
182

See Standardand Poor'sImplements Credit Enhancement Criteria,supra

note 93.
183

Telephone Interview with Debbie Goldstein, Center for Responsible

Lending (Sept. 27, 2004).

See also ASSIGNEE LIABILITY: PROTECTING

HOMEOWNERS, STRENGTHENING THE MARKET, CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE
LENDING,
Oct. 18, 2004, available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/

pdfs/ib020-AssigneeLiability- 1004.pdf.
184 See Home Ownership Security Act, N.J.
185

STAT.

ANN. § 46: 1OB-27 (2004).

See id. at § 46: 1OB-27(b):

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any person who purchases
or is otherwise assigned a high-cost home loan shall be subject to all
affirmative claims and any defenses with respect to the loan that the
borrower could assert against the original creditor or broker of the loan;
provided that this subsection shall not apply if the purchaser or assignee
demonstrates, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a reasonable
person exercising reasonable due diligence could not determine that the
mortgage was a high-cost home loan. It shall be presumed that a
purchaser or assignee has exercised such due diligence if the purchaser
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assignees to fully internalize the cost of their misbehavior, and
therefore creates an optimal incentive for self-policing. By contrast,
HOEPA's capped damages for negligent assignees arguably
encourages insufficient due diligence. In addition, New Jersey Statute
section 46:1 OB-27 defines "ordinary due diligence" more expansively
than section 1641(d) of HOEPA, by requiring purchasers to
implement policies and practices to avoid purchasing predatory high
cost loans. 1 6 Even if assignees meet this higher due diligence duty,
they are still liable for limited damages equal to the amount of debt
remaining in the borrower's account plus reasonable attorney's
fees. 187 This strict liability provision provides broader protection to
or assignee demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that it: (1)
has in place at the time of the purchase or assignment of the loan,
policies that expressly prohibit its purchase or acceptance of
assignment of any high-cost home loan; (2) requires by contract that a
seller or assignor of home loans to the purchaser or assignee represents
and warrants to the purchaser or assignee that either (a) it will not sell
or assign any high-cost home loan to the purchaser or assignee or (b)
that the seller or assignor is a beneficiary of a representation and
warranty from a previous seller or assignor to that effect; and (3)
exercises reasonable due diligence at the time of purchase or
assignment of home loans or within a reasonable period of time
thereafter intended by the purchaser or assignee to prevent the
purchaser or assignee from purchasing or taking assignment of any
high-cost home loan.
186 Id.
187

See id. at § 46:1OB-27.

(c) Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, but limited to
amounts requiredto reduce or extinguish the borrower'sliability under
the home loan plus amounts required to recover costs including
reasonable attorney's fees, a borrower acting only in an individual
capacity may assert against the creditor or any subsequent holder or
assignee of the home loan:
1) within six years of the closing of a high-cost home loan, a violation
of this act in connection with the loan as an original action; and
2) at any time during the term of a high-cost home loan after an action
to collect on the home loan or foreclose on the collateral securing the
home loan has been initiated or the debt arising from the home loan has
been accelerated or the home loan has become 60 days in default, any
defense, claim or counterclaim (emphasis added).
(e) Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the substantive
rights, remedies or procedural rights, including, but not limited to,
recoupment rights under the common law, available to a borrower
against any creditor, assignee or holder under any other law. The
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borrowers, such as Ms. Jenkins, who face court decisions finding that
the assignee exercised the statutorily-required level of due
Unlike rescission under § 1635, which a borrower can
diligence.
only take advantage of if he is able to secure a source of refinancing,
the New Jersey Act's strict liability provision insures that all victims
of predatory lending will have recourse against their predatory loans.
In addition, extending the statute of limitations to six years insures
that the New Jersey Act provides greater enforceability of its
protections, particularly in foreclosure actions where even the six
year statute of limitations does not apply." 189
B. Assignee Liability for All Loans Under Common Law
The landmark decision of In re FirstAlliance Mortgage Co.
presented the first instance where a financier was held accountable
for the predatory practices of a mortgage originator under common
law fraud. 190 In First Alliance, a class of First Alliance mortgagors
sued the investment bank Lehman Brothers. The class claim arose
under the California common law theory of aiding and abetting fraud.
Specifically, class plaintiffs alleged that Lehman Brothers financed
First Alliance Mortgage Company through a warehouse line of credit,
purchased the company's loan production, and securitized portfolios
of the company's loans as mortgage-backed securities, even though
r9
Lehman Brothers knew about the company's fraudulent conduct. '
The First Alliance court held that Lehman Brothers could be liable
for First Alliance's lending violations because "Lehman's credit
facility made First Alliance's fraudulent practices possible."' 92 The
limitations on assignee liability in subsection b. of this section shall not
apply to the assignee liability in subsections a., c. and d. of this section.
188 See supra Part IV.C. (discussing Jenkins v. Mercantile Mortgage Co., 231
F. Supp. 2d 737 (N.D. Ill. 2002)).
189 Given the recent passage of the New Jersey Act, there is not yet any
published case law analyzing the statute's scope.
190 In re First Alliance Mortgage Co., 298 B.R. 652 (C.D. Cal. 2003). See also
Anne Linberry, Lehman Liable in PredatoryLending Case Reports Say Company
Liablefor 10% of FirstAlliance, FTC Settlement, MORTGAGEDAILY.COM, June 19,

2003, http://www.mortgagebankers.org/briefs/03/0619a.html.
191 FirstAlliance Mortg.
192

Co., 298 B.R. at 660-664.

NOT WITH OUR MONEY, Caught in the act:

Lehman ordered to pay $5 million for financing First Alliance's fraudulent loans
David
0.
Carter),
District Court
Judge
(2002)
(quoting
Federal

http://www.notwithourmoney.org/04-lehman/lending5.html (last visited: Dec. 23,
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jury proceeded to award First Alliance borrowers damages totaling
$51 million, with Lehman's responsibility allocated at 10%. 19
California is not unique in recognizing that financiers of
illegal activity can be held liable for the illegal conduct that they
finance. 194 Thus, First Alliance creates a powerful precedent for
using state law to pursue claims against assignees that knowingly
finance the activities of predatory lenders. Accordingly, consumer
advocates have recently focused attention on state common law as an
alternative source of assignee liability.195 Still, unlike HOEPA, which
imposes the burden on assignees to show reasonable due diligence,
aiding and abetting fraud requires plaintiffs to prove that the assignee
had knowledge of the originator's wrongful conduct.1 96 The First
Alliance plaintiffs succeeded in proving knowledge because of the
widespread fraud litigation already pending against First Alliance at
the time Lehman Brothers extended the warehouse credit facility.1 97
Proving knowledge of the wrongful conduct in future cases will be
the difficult battle for most plaintiffs and their attorneys.
Common law includes several other theories which may also
be used to challenge the assignee's ability to hide behind the
protections of the HDC doctrine. 19 8 For example, borrowers may
challenge the assignee's status as an HDC by showing that the
assignee had knowledge of defenses against the loan when the
assignee bought the predatory mortgages. 199 Alternatively, borrowers
2004).
193

See Linberry, supra note 190.

194

See Henriques, supra note 19.

195

Telephone Interview with Debbie Goldstein, Center for Responsible

Lending (Sept. 27, 2004).
196 Compare § 1641(d)(1) with In re First Alliance Mortg. Co. 298 B.R. at
668.
197

See In re FirstAlliance Mortg. Co., 298 B.R. at 668.

198

Substantial review and analysis of these theories is beyond the scope of this

article. For further consideration of these theories and recent cases which illustrate
their application see Jeffrey P. Naimon, Jacob Thiessen & Jennifer Beall, Assignee
Liability in Residential Mortgage Transactions, REVIEW OF BANKING AND
FINANCIAL SERVICES, Vol. 19, No. 3, Mar. 1, 2003, 2003 WL 14680965.
199 See U.C.C. § 3-302 (2002) (defining a "holder in due course" as the holder
of an instrument if:
(1) the instrument when issued or negotiated to the holder does not bear
such apparent evidence of forgery or alteration or is not otherwise so
irregular or incomplete as to call into question its authenticity; and
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may argue that the originating creditor and its assignee are so
interconnected that the agreement by which the assignee "buys" loans
from the lender is really a pretense, and thus that the assignee should
not be able to take advantage of the protections of the HDC
doctrine. ° ° To the extent that statutory assignee liability is limited in
the future, common law theories will continue to present a unique
opportunity for all borrowers to pursue claims against assignees for
violations by lenders; unlike statutory claims, the common law claims
are not limited to a subcategory of high cost subprime mortgages.
C. Preemption Challenges to Assignee Liability Under State Law
Several states have supplemented HOEPA's assignee liability
scheme with a more expansive system to police the secondary market
and to protect consumers. As illustrated with the example of the New
Jersey Act, many of these provisions are more protective than
HOEPA. Likewise, state common law may also broaden the basis for
claims against assignees. However, borrowers litigating assignee
liability under state laws will likely step into the minefield of
preemption debates which challenge the constitutionality of state
anti-predatory lending laws. Specifically, the Office of Thrift
Supervision ("OTS"), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
("OCC"), and the National Credit Union Administration ("NCUA")
have all issued opinions substantially preempting several state antipredatory lending laws. 20 For example, the OCC's Final Rule
regarding the applicability of state laws to national banks provides

(2) the holder took the instrument (i) for value, (ii) in good faith, (iii)
without notice that the instrument is overdue or has been dishonored or
that there is an uncured default with respect to payment of another
instrument issued as part of the same series, (iv) without notice that the
instrument contains an unauthorized signature or has been altered, (v)
without notice of any claim to the instrument described in Section 3306, and (vi) without notice that any party has a defense or claim in
recoupment described in Section 3-305(a)) (emphasis added).
200 See, Midfirst Bank, SSB v. C.W. Haynes & Co., Inc., 893 F.Supp. 1304,
1318 (D.S.C. 1994) (discussing the "close-connectedness" doctrine); Jeffrey P.
Naimon, Jacob Thiessen & Jennifer Beall, Assignee in Residential Mortgage

Transactions,REVIEW OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL SERVICES, Vol. 19, No. 3, Mar.
1, 2003 (discussing the application of the Holder in Due Course doctrine in "sham"

transactions).
201 See Donald C. Lampe, Federal Preemption and the Future of Mortgage
Loan Regulation, 59 Bus. LAW. 1207, 1210-11 (reviewing the preemption orders

and opinion of various state agencies).
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that "state laws that obstruct, impair, or condition a national bank's
ability to fully exercise its federally authorized real estate lending
powers" do not apply to national banks. 20 2 While these preemption
decisions focus on attacks on state statutes, the agencies' broad claim
to preempt "state laws" may be extended to state common law as
well. There is still some uncertainty regarding the regulation of nonnational bank assignees that purchase high cost loans originated by
institutions regulated by these federal agencies. 20 3 However, the OTS
has already made clear that its rationale for preemption extends to
regulation of purchasers of mortgage loans originated by covered
institutions. 204 Thus, the legal community must also keep a close
watch on the preemption debates to determine the viability of
assignee liability claims under state law.

Conclusion
The lack of accountability in the subprime mortgage market
creates incentives for brokers to push subprime mortgages onto too
many consumers, at too high a cost, for purposes unrelated to home
ownership. 20 5 As a result of these equity-stripping mortgages,
thousands of consumers are forced into foreclosure each year.20 6
HOEPA was Congress' initial response to this widespread and
devastating problem. Despite its limitations, HOEPA's expanded
provisions for assignee liability can be a powerful mechanism for
restoring accountability to the subprime mortgage market.

Bank Activities and Operations, Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69
Fed. Reg. 1904 (OCC, Jan. 13, 2004) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 7).
202

Id. (stating that the OCC ruling was silent on the issue of whether assignee
liability provisions contained in state including anti-predatory lending laws apply to
non-national bank assignees of loans originated by national banks).
204 See Priv. Ltr. Rul. P-2003-5, Preemption of New Jersey Predatory Lending
203

Act, Home Owners' Loan Act/Savings Association Powers (Office of Thrift
Supervision, July
22,
2003), available at http://www.ots.treas.gov/
docs/5/56305.pdf.
205 See Saunders, supra note 1, at 115.
See http://www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/brd/12Bunce.pdf (last visited
Nov. 19, 2005) (examining data showing the increased number of foreclosures
attributed to subprime loans).
206

